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Global economics and other factors make it increasingly difficult for organizations to operate 
within the boundaries of one country in a rational way (e.g., leveraging best practices, profitable,  
achieving  goals).  In this study, I looked at strategic business alliances, transcending simple quid 
pro quo relationships to deliver ongoing partner value.  I refined my study to multicultural 
relationships, having differing cultural identities (i.e., ideas, heritage, language, or demographics 
from differing geographies).  Finally, I considered asymmetry (i.e., inequity in working 
relationship).  Using a mixed-methodology design, I surveyed alliance participants and 
interviewed participants from selected alliances.  A multi-case study addresses emergent themes 
of participants from these alliances, day-to-day experiences, and ways in which leaders 
intervened.  Drawing from these experiences, observations are presented about the nature of 
these alliances and their increasing contemporary relevance.  The electronic version of this 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
If one looks at contemporary businesses, it is difficult to find examples of organizations 
that operate on a significant scale without a form of collaboration.  Global economics, 
availability of goods and services, statutory environments, the need for hedging and risk 
mitigation, and other factors make it increasingly difficult for organizations to operate without 
some form of partnership in a rational way.  One answer to these challenges is collaboration.  
Collaboration has been studied from many perspectives and for many reasons.  For 
example, Gulati (2007) wrote extensively on the value of alliances in business: 
Over the past two decades, researchers have become fascinated with the growing array of 
cooperative ties that firms are entering into with each other.  While much of the previous 
research has focused on the dynamics of competition, scholars are increasingly 
redirecting their interest to aspects of cooperative behavior.  One of the fastest growing 
sets of inter-organizational ties has been strategic alliances that firms enter into to achieve 
a common goal. (p. 1) 
 
At its fundamental level, the concept of collaboration speaks to the sharing of resources, 
often to allow the involved constituencies to do what they do best and leverage core 
competencies of others.  Collaboration also drives soft benefits to the involved parties, such as 
facilitating coordination and control.  Most large enterprises realize that performing all functions 
necessary to effectuate a global supply chain within one organization is wasteful of resources, 
ineffective, or even impossible; thus, they collaborate with other organizations to conduct 
business in a more productive way.  If everyone operates in a self-serving way, efficiency is lost 
and all suffer.  When individuals and groups collaborate, specialization can occur and collective 
benefits can arise, often making the difference between subsistence and thriving—or even the 
difference between life and death as, for example, when rescue and relief organizations 




Increasingly, collaboration in the business world takes the form of organizations from 
differing cultural backgrounds forming alliances.  This alliance-forming is one type of 
collaboration.  By contrast, other types of collaboration might include outsourcing arrangements, 
contract work, and short-term relationships formed to achieve a specific goal.  In many respects, 
multicultural collaborations (or contentions) are not designed intentionally, but rather the natural 
progression of events and innovation taking place on a global scale.  For example, Gajjala (2003) 
wrote of the pace of expansion of multicultural interaction: 
As we rediscovered with deadly clarity in the month of September 2001, globalization, 
information communication technologies, nationalisms, and religious diasporas are 
inextricably linked with a need for intercultural understanding.  The world becoming 
“smaller” is enabled through a variety of technologies, and the clashing of various 
cultural, religious, and political discourses and extremisms has material consequences.  
(p. 168) 
 
Leaders of multicultural business alliances must understand such differences and leverage them 
to produce targeted benefits and mitigate the potential marginalization of the collaborating 
parties.  It is also important to be specific when considering the term multicultural, which in this 
context refers to demographic origins from different parts of the world and the implications for 
the way in which the alliance parties conduct business. 
In business, collaboration can take many forms.  Partnership is a term that has both 
general and specific meaning.  Various legal forms allow groups to combine forces and yet 
separate assets and differentiate liability.  Other structures provide for two organizations to form 
a jointly owned third, thus further differentiating the areas in which they collaborate and 
separating their pre-existing business concerns.  In a broad sense, such business relationships are 




Establishing a Working Definition of Terms 
Strategic alliances.  For the purposes of this research, the term alliances was chosen to 
be as inclusive as possible.  The term refers to relationships among parties, typically for the 
purpose of achieving a common goal.  Spekman, Isabella, and MacAvoy (2000) provided a 
useful definition of the term:  “an alliance is a close, collaborative relationship between two, or 
more, firms with the intent of accomplishing mutually compatible goals that would be difficult 
for each to accomplish alone” (p. 37). 
The term strategic alliance is more specific.  In a literature review, Taylor (2005) 
delineated a strategic alliance as follows:   
• two or more firms that unite to pursue a set of agreed goals, yet remain independent 
subsequent to the formation of the alliance; 
• the partner firms share the benefits of the alliance and control over the assigned tasks; 
and, 
• the partner firms contribute on an ongoing basis to one or more strategic areas, e.g., 
technology, product development or marketing. (p. 471) 
 
This summary provides a foundational definition of the type of relationships of interest.  Taylor 
cited additional authors who classified alliances by complexity of the alliance agreement, 
alliance objective, and other factors; but Taylor’s clear, three-point definition emerges as most 
useful.  In the original source referenced in Taylor’s work, Yoshino and Rangan (1995) provided 
additional context to the concept of strategic alliance described by Taylor as follows: 
A strategic alliance links specific facets of the businesses of two or more firms.  At its 
core, this link is a trading partnership that enhances the effectiveness of the competitive 
strategies of the participating firms by providing for the mutually beneficial trade of 
technologies, skills, or products based upon them.  An alliance can take a variety of 





Multiculture.  Added to the understanding of the type of relationship, there is a second 
concept:  multiculture. Hall (1989) presented an intriguing depiction of culture: 
Nevertheless, and in spite of many differences in detail, anthropologists do agree on three 
characteristics of culture: it is not innate, but learned; the various facets of culture are 
interrelated—you touch a culture in one place and everything else is affected; it is shared 
and in effect defines the boundaries of different groups. (p. 16) 
 
The concept of culture is broad and nuanced, as Hall implied.  For this study, focus is 
particularly on those aspects of culture that have their genesis in national origin.  Thus, 
multicultural for the purposes of this research pertained to the aspects of a relationship in which 
the constituent parties identify with more than one national cultural context.  The term 
multicultural collaboration is intended to combine the concepts of collaboration and multiculture 
to include situations where the collaborating counterparties represent ideas, corporate cultural 
identities, educational foundation, heritage, language, and other demographic aspects from 
differing parts of the world.  
 It is also important to distinguish between the terms multinational and multicultural with 
respect to organizations.  Although these two terms are often used interchangeably, there is a 
distinction.  Organizations can be multinational if they have a business presence (market, 
manufacturing, etc.) in more than one country.  Often, however, such organizations merely 
export one culture to remote locations, taking great pains to sustain leadership language, 
interpersonal behavior, and corporate identity in a holistic, ethnocentric manner.  To be 
multicultural, organizations must go beyond geography, origin, and language and identify with 
more than one culture, regardless of geographic dispersal.  To the extent that two culturally 
different organizations are collaborating in a business relationship, there will be an impact to that 
collaboration resulting from their multicultural diversity.  By focusing on the second concept of 




the diversity of such situations.  I, thus, expanded on the more simplistic understanding of 
business benefits derived only from two organizations having collaborated in some way and 
explore what kinds of leadership strategies, skills, and perspectives are essential in these 
situations.  Added to the understanding of strategic alliances, this second dimension informs 
views of multiculture as described above, bias (both good and bad) and perspective that can have 
dramatic impact on the ultimate benefit experienced by the involved parties.  
Asymmetry.  Against this evolving understanding of multicultural collaboration, I have 
also considered the concept of asymmetry.  Asymmetry in the context of business relationships 
relates to the existence of an imbalance in power, organizational mandate, funding, size, or other 
resource area.  Taylor (2005) cited asymmetry in certain alliances based on learning readiness, 
for example: “this asymmetry depends on the degree of alliance learning readiness, or the extent 
to which a partner is receptive to collaboration” (p. 473).  This third dimension of asymmetry 
introduces a crucial nuance to the sharing of organizational power, recognition of innovation, 
ability to execute, and distribution of benefit to involved parties. 
Evolving the Concept of Studying Strategic, Asymmetric, Multicultural Alliances 
 One way of looking at differentiating alliances would be to take a binary perspective: 
they either are or are not strategic, asymmetric, or multicultural.  This binary concept leads to a 















Figure 1.1. A simplistic view of categorizing alliances. 
  
In discussion of this concept, a noteworthy abstracting enhancement to this model 
emerged: considering these dimensions not as absolute boundaries, but more as vectors.  
Alliances are neither categorically strategic or nonstrategic, multicultural or nonmulticultural, 
symmetric or asymmetric; rather, these concepts vary from alliance to alliance.  Essentially, any 
alliance could fit into the expanded conceptual model.  The theoretical model thus considered 





Figure 1.2. Considering vectors instead of binary boundaries expands the model. 
The model is more inclusive.  Essentially, most forms of collaboration can be represented 
in the extensible space of the open-ended model.  The new model allows for evolution of thought 
in terms of what is considered multicultural over time as global dynamics evolve.  Implications 
of multiculture, as described above, can essentially be a progression along the y-axis of the 
model.  Alliances can be explored against this model without regard to whether or not they fit in 
the box of the original model.  The extent to which other insight might be gained is essentially 
unconstrained by the categorization methodology.  
Background and Positioning 
My professional life has involved international business for over 30 years.  I have worked 
for foreign-owned companies operating in the United States, participated in due diligence for 
multinational acquisitions and joint ventures, and negotiated contract terms and service levels for 
asymmetric cross-border relationships in outsourcing and related relationships.  I have been both 




individuals operating in a flexible staffing model in an off-shore location.  In that role, I 
implemented programs to foster increased cultural awareness and collaboration.  
In my current role as a senior leader for a multinational firm, I have held positions in 
operations, technology, and strategy.  All of these positions involved significant cross-border 
collaborative efforts.  Currently, I lead cross-functional groups with ongoing efforts in countries 
in North America, Asia, and Europe.  These teams regularly collaborate on joint projects that 
provide benefit to my organization, to the respective regions involved in collaboration, and to 
customers whose area of interest is global or multinational.  Specifically, my company recently 
completed significant strategic joint ventures in China and Japan, and has working partnerships 
in Iberia, Australia, Latin America, and elsewhere.  I have personally been involved with many 
of these ventures and partnerships, both as one of the enablers of certain aspects of the 
collaboration, and as participant in either due diligence before deals have been made or in 
realization of the benefits subsequent to the initial collaborative event.  Accordingly, I have 
pondered how best to lead in complex multicultural situations.  I have considered why certain 
multicultural collaborative efforts go well while many others seem to struggle, or fail.  
Academically, the underpinnings of leading change in international business have always 
been of interest to me.  As I pursued my MBA, I discovered the complexities layered onto 
traditional business activities by introducing a multinational dimension.  Common precursors of 
change such as negotiating a contract, developing joint policies, understanding future success 
metrics, and conducting portfolio analysis relative to prospective partners take on greater 
complexity when distinct cultures, statutory requirements, perceptions of ethics, and social 




Gaps in the Literature Addressed by this Study 
As a natural outcome of the increase in alliance activity in business, authors have been, 
not surprisingly, focused on success factors in alliances.  As treated in the literature review in 
chapter 2, studies have touched on the concepts of asymmetry and multiculture.  Research seems 
to be largely descriptive, however, with regard to the shift in alliance activity from domestic to 
multinational and from agreements among equals to partnerships that are highly asymmetric.  I 
have focused on the consequence of strategic content, asymmetry, and multiculture taken 
simultaneously in the context of successful alliances.  Observing that some alliances manage to 
be successful despite the additional challenges of globalization and asymmetry, I explored what 
can be learned from alliance managers and participants in those very special alliances.  
Research Questions 
The first purpose of the dissertation is to understand better how successful strategic 
alliances fall into this three-space mode.  Subsequent to that, my second purpose was to isolate 
certain alliances of interest and then to delve deeper into the experiences of alliance participants.  
Studies show dramatic failure rates in alliances.  For example, Gulati, Khanna, and Nohria 
(1994) wrote: 
Several studies have reported failure rates as high as 80 percent, failure that usually leads 
to their [the allied parties] dissolution or acquisition by one of the partners.  Prominent 
failures in the automobile industry alone include, for example, alliances between General 
Motors and Daewoo Corporation, General Motors and Isuzu Motors, Chrysler and 
Mitsubishi Motors, Chrysler and Miserati, Fiat and Nissan. (p. 61) 
 
Another example of the high degree of alliance failure was presented by Zineldin and Dodourova 
(2005), who studied failure in strategic alliances, with a focus on the automotive industry: 
A large number of industrial manufacturers are forming various types of alliances in a bid 
to improve their competitive position.  The number of strategic alliances has almost 
doubled in the past 10 years and is expected to increase even more in the future.  




strategic alliances, few succeed.  The failure rate of strategic alliances is projected to be 
as high as 70 percent. (p. 460) 
 
My first question, therefore, was: 
Q1: To what extent does the degree of strategic, asymmetric, and multicultural makeup of 
an alliance relate to the success of the collaboration? 
Important to answering this question was, of course, an effective definition of success in 
alliances.  For the purposes of my dissertation, I adopted from published, peer-reviewed 
empirical research what seems to be a popular working definition.  For example, in “The Way to 
Win in Cross-Border Alliances,” Bleeke and Ernst (1991) defined a successful alliance with two 
tests: “ . . . both partners achieved their ingoing [sic] strategic objectives and both recovered their 
financial costs of capital.  Progress on the strategic objectives was based on market share, sales 
volume, new product development, or other criteria specific to the alliance” (p. 197).  I also 
looked for additional definitions that are more inclusive of culture and asymmetry as this sample 
definition is silent on those dimensions. 
I also used published literature, discussions with advisors, and empirical studies 
describing qualities, characteristics, and observations of strategic alliances, multicultural 
makeup, and asymmetry as the basis for my research into the first research question.  My related 
hypothesis for this question was that a high degree of strategic, asymmetric, and multicultural 
(SAM) content (as indicated by survey responses) directly relates to less likelihood to succeed.  
Ultimately, I evolved the following conceptual model of the first phase of my research, depicted 
in Figure 1.3.  Accordingly, the survey looked at the three dimensions of the model, plus a 
definition of success applied to the alliance.  The survey participants’ responses allowed 





Figure 1.3. The first phase of the study: Survey to identify alliances of interest.   
 Having surveyed alliance participants to be able to stratify alliances according to SAM 
content (i.e., high or low in each of the dimensions) as described in the theoretical model, the 
second part of the study focused on the experiences of alliance participants in successful 
alliances.  Of particular interest were those situations with high SAM content (i.e., highly 
strategic, significant multicultural makeup, and marked asymmetry when compared to other 
alliances studied).  My additional research questions were as follows: 
Q2: What are the emergent themes of leaders in these endeavors? 
Q3: How do SAM characteristics influence the day-to-day experiences of alliance 
participants and collaborating organizations? 





 It was appropriate to pursue these questions by interviewing alliance participants to form 
a second, qualitative part of the mixed-method study.  A conceptual depiction of the second 
phase of this mixed-methods study is depicted in Figure 1.4. 
 
Figure 1.4. The second phase of the study: Exploring the experiences. 
 As business alliances move more into this upper-quadrant space, it is my hope that this 
research will help alliance leaders and participants to better understand the makeup of their 
relationships and the challenges and opportunities inherent therein.  This research is not a how-to 
work for succeeding in these complex alliances, nor do I harbor any pretense that this method of 
looking at alliances will, in and of itself, provide all of the insight necessary to alter the 
staggering odds against alliance success.  Rather, it is my hope that this research might inform 




contributes to a greater body of understanding, thus benefiting leaders in complex alliances and 
those who further study these relationships.  
In research leading to this dissertation, I observed that many alliance leaders are thrust 
into their role, often with little or no formal understanding of alliance experience.  By 
understanding at least one way to frame the nature of a complex alliance, alliance participants 
and future researchers have an example of thinking about these complex relationships in a 
discrete, deterministic fashion (i.e., two people using the same method could likely come up with 
similar results).  Furthermore, understanding something about the experiences and learnings of 
leaders in these alliances, especially those that are successful, could lead to a more informed 
perspective on alliance success in strategic, asymmetric, multicultural collaboration. 
Scope of this Study 
There were, of necessity, limitations and conceptual considerations in this study related to 
the nature of the alliances of interest.  First and foremost is the issue of language.  As was seen 
from the trials considered as part of research leading to this dissertation, I considered the impact 
of language, especially because participants in cross-border alliances could include non-English 
speakers.  
I  decided to limit the scope of this study to English speakers for the survey portion, in 
order to minimize the risk of misinterpretation of results.  One example of the risks of 
multilingual survey came from my reading of Berry and Kaldm (1995) in both French and 
English.  I was interested in how researchers who were not multilingual might come away from 
the study with different conclusions.  For example, Berry and Kaldm wrote, “in the total sample, 
attitudes toward multiculturalism were moderately positive, and tolerance moderately high; there 




translation reads, “Pour l'ensemble de l'échantillon, les attitudes à l'endroit du multiculturalisme 
étaient passablement positives, et le degré de tolérance passablement élevé; on constatait aussi 
un sens relativement élevé d'attachement et d'engagement au Canada” (pp. 301-302).  Reading 
this sentence, I pondered how the English-speaking reader and the French-speaking reader come 
away with subtly different interpretations.  In particular, the phrase “moderately positive” in 
English is translated “passablement positives” in French.  Similarly, “moderately high” becomes 
“passablement élevé.”  The term “moderately” in English is more or less neutral in this context; 
however, the term “passablement” in French can mean “acceptably,” which has a slightly 
negative connotation in this context. (The second word, élevé, means “elevated” in exactly the 
same sense in both French and English).  One can easily see from this small example how 
sincere attempts to translate can introduce unintended nuance.  
Another important scope consideration of this study was the size of the survey pool.  I sought 
to survey enough individuals to identify three successful (as characterized by studies cited above), 
high-SAM alliances.  It was vital in so doing to recognize the implications of any learning derived 
from the qualitative part of the study and to avoid generalization outside the system of alliances 
studied. 
Finally, there were certain types of alliances that were not appropriate for research.  For 
example, I was not able to interact with any alliances involved in overtly illegal activity, even though 
such alliances can be highly successful by some definitions and can clearly have high SAM content.  
Other types of alliances that were not accessible to me were those of a highly secretive nature, 





Criteria on Which I Hope this Work to be Evaluated 
It is essential to consider the criteria on which I hope this work to be evaluated.  
Accordingly, I have looked at the works of those authors cited in this dissertation and how both 
the academic and business communities appeared to have received their work.  I find the 
academic literature to be received largely in a face-value context—evaluated on the strength of 
the research, appropriateness of the literature considered by the author, the internal and external 
validity of the findings, fairness and appropriateness of the method, or the reasonableness of the 
conclusions drawn.  Review of such work has guided my decision of a method that is both 
rigorous and inclusive of both quantitative and qualitative aspects of alliances.  My hope is that 
the academic community will similarly consider my efforts here.  I accordingly applied academic 
rigor and to use the tools techniques and learning I have acquired in my doctoral studies as a 
guide. 
I find the business community, in receiving empirical studies and other work related to 
this topic to be largely pragmatic about either the short term or longer term strategic usefulness 
to the problems of their business at hand.  That reflection has, in part, guided my selection of a 
topic that is relevant to the trends in business today, as well as the concerns of leaders who are 
facing business problems that are increasingly global in scope and more likely to involve 
collaboration.  I hope to provide meaningful content for those who might read this work from a 
business perspective to inform the problems they face day-to-day, and perhaps, to expand the 
perspectives from which they consider these problems.  Also, I hope to encourage reflective 
leadership that goes beyond the practical implications of succeeding in terms of growing 
business success to consider broader perspectives such as social consciousness, the ramifications 




environments within which alliances operate.  Finally, I hope to highlight the opportunity costs 
of failing to act in a reflective way by showing the much broader way in which these alliances 
can be studied. 
As a guide to my research, therefore, I held in my mind these questions:  
• Have I been fair to different perspectives from which alliances could be judged? (i.e., 
Have I considered the differing perspectives and how those perspectives might 
influence any conclusions?) 
• Have I considered the impacts of strategic alliances not only from a perspective of the 
business benefit achieved from such efforts, but also from a perspective of benefit to 
the individuals in the organizations and the communities within which those alliances 
operate? 
• Have I captured the experience of successfully navigating strategic, asymmetric, 
multicultural alliances and shed light on how the alliance experience plays out for the 
alliance participants so as to inform others who may consider either studying such 
alliances or participating in them? 
• Have I contributed not only to the literature related to this type of alliance, but also to 
a greater understanding of the experience of such alliances? 
• Have I provided insight that stems from my research and personal experience in this 
field? 
• Have I provided a basis for stimulating others interested in this area to continue my 
research and/or the research of others, either in ways I have alluded to or in ways I 




Chapter II: Review of the Literature 
To facilitate a review of the literature relevant to this topic of study, I have presented an 
evolution of the basic concepts involved.  First, a synthesis of the concepts relating to 
collaboration in general is derived from the leadership literature.  The underpinnings of 
collaboration form an understanding of how organizations come together to collaborate, and the 
various ways in which such collaboration can be manifested.  From that understanding, each of 
the core concepts relating to successful, strategic, asymmetric, multicultural alliances is 
presented.  
Leadership in Relationship to Multicultural Strategic Alliances  
The study of leadership in a multicultural setting presents a valuable context for any 
contemporary understanding of complex alliances.  Particularly relevant to the study of 
leadership in various cultures is the work of the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior 
Effectiveness (GLOBE) research program.  This 10-year research program focused on key 
aspects of leadership in 62 countries.  House and Javidan (2004) set context for the importance 
of such a study:  
Given the increasing globalization of industrial organizations and the growing 
interdependencies among nations, the need for a better understanding of cultural 
influences on leadership and organizational practices has never been greater.  Leaders 
confront situations that are highly complex, constantly evolving, and difficult to interpret.  
Managers of global firms are facing unprecedented fierce and rapidly changing 
competition. (p. 10) 
 
Such interdependence is exemplified by the formation of alliances among partnering 
organizations from different countries.  Among the many questions considered by the study, the 
researchers of GLOBE studied leaders’ behaviors, practices, and key attributes in an attempt to 




Another key focus of the study that relates to alliances is the consideration of the relationship 
between societal cultural variables and international competitiveness.  
 The GLOBE research provides many insights that are important to the study of 
multicultural collaboration.  For example, Dorfman and House (2004) presented the concept of 
leader prototypes and preferences for leadership styles varying significantly by national 
orientation.  Considering such nuances when looking at the countries involved in multicultural 
alliances is crucial to understanding the potential drivers of behavior and outcomes of the 
collaborative relationship.  
 Among the many important conclusions of the GLOBE study, Javidan et al. (2004) 
offered a compelling observation that relates directly to cross-cultural alliances.  The authors 
noted the increasing rate of multicultural collaboration and competition.  They further presented 
the paradox that, although current literature typically considers differing cultures separately, 
authors often try to speculate about cultural contact among those separate cultures.  Wrote 
Javidan et al., “despite somewhat conflicting findings, the conventional wisdom is that cultural 
distance is dysfunctional and leads to failure of cross-border mergers” (p. 730).  The GLOBE 
research took this conventional wisdom further.  Javidan et al. wrote:  
It is important to consider the possibility that cultural contact between two or more 
separate cultures entails unique dynamics that go beyond these objective measures [i.e., 
measures of cultural distance] of each culture.  Objective measures of each culture may 
not be sufficient to understand what happens during the contact.  What is probably 
important is not how a culture is objectively measured but how it is subjectively 
perceived by those from another culture. (pp. 730-731) 
 
Trompenaars and Woolliams (2003) also treated this concept of cultural context in 
organizational leadership, specifically cautioning that one must be careful not to presume the 
extensibility of successful methods when different geographies are involved: “many of the 




appropriate in the cultures where they were researched, developed, and validated” (p. 157).  The 
authors maintained that, in order to drive effective evolution in organizations in the next century, 
new processes must allow for the surfacing and reflection upon presumptions that may have been 
narrowly informed from a global cultural perspective.  Thus, the GLOBE study and the work of 
authors such as Trompenaars and Woolliams, provides context for the consideration of 
successful, high-SAM alliances.  The research provides a foundation for the supposition that the 
multicultural makeup of these relationships plays a critical part not only in the difficulty of 
success, but also in the ultimate subjective assessment of the alliance experience.  
  To relate the important evolution of multicultural strategic alliances to the broader study 
of leadership, it is helpful to look at leadership literature with an eye to strategic alliances.  One 
can see the emergence of important themes that are foundational.  Although the context 
surrounding collaboration is treated in the broader leadership literature, strategic alliances are 
more the subject of dedicated works. 
An example of the foundational thinking can be found in Northouse (2004), who wrote of 
various approaches important to the understanding of dimensions of leadership.  In developing a 
working definition of leadership, Northouse wrote: 
Despite the multitude of ways that leadership has been conceptualized, the following 
components can be identified as central to the phenomenon of leadership: (a) leadership 
is a process, (b) leadership involves influence, (c) leadership occurs within a group 
context, and (d) leadership involves goal attainment. (p. 3) 
 
The second tenet relates to influence, but is silent on how that influence might need to change 
when a multicultural alliance structure is in place.  Nevertheless, there is useful insight in the 
leadership approaches treated by the author.  One of the approaches Northouse described was the 




Most early scholars studying groups agreed on two critical functions of leadership: (a) to 
help the group accomplish its task (task function) and (b) to keep the group maintained 
and functioning (maintenance function).  Scholars studying intact work teams have also 
referred to these same two functions as team performance and team development.          
(p. 205) 
 
These functions, wrote Northouse, need not be carried out exclusively by the leader, but can be 
augmented by experienced members of the team.  Abstracting the theory described by Northouse 
to the existence of multicultural teams operating in a complex strategic alliance, the need for 
helping the group accomplish its task becomes increasingly complex because the two or more 
collaborating parties may have different needs from the alliance and by extension from the 
leadership of that alliance.  Furthermore, developing the alliance becomes more complex as well 
becuase leaders become increasingly reliant on more experienced members who have specific 
knowledge relevant to the cultural perspectives and ways of leading which are appropriate from 
their unique perspectives.  
 Another relevant conceptualization can be found in Heifetz (1994), who wrote of 
situations in leadership that generate useful adaptation to endemic challenges, adapting the term 
holding environment from psychoanalysis: 
For my purposes I extend the use of the term "holding environment" beyond parental and 
therapeutic relationships.  A holding environment consists of any relationship in which 
one party has the power to hold the attention of another party and facilitate adaptive 
work.  I apply it to any relationship that has a developmental task or opportunity—
including relationships between politicians and their polities, nations and other nations, 
coaches and their teams, managers and subordinates, and even relationships between 
friends.  The holding environment can generate adaptive work because it contains and 
regulates the stresses that work generates. (pp. 104-105) 
 
Looking at strategic alliances as relationships that form to meet the needs of the collaborating 
parties in ways that they could not otherwise achieve independently, one can see the emergence 
of the type of adaptive work that Heifetz described.  Alliances can achieve goals collectively that 




 Some authors have treated the subject of collaboration in a very simple form as the 
pursuit of mutual purposes.  For example, Rost (1993) described the concept of the pursuit of 
mutual purpose in the context of leaders and followers:  
When leaders and followers have several purposes, the likelihood of mutuality is 
enhanced because different leaders and followers can emphasize related purposes and 
still achieve some mutuality.  It also means that there are several purposes around which 
different followers and leaders can build a common vision or mission. (p. 118)  
 
Rost’s depiction of the pursuit of common purpose is perhaps the simplest and most pure concept 
that extrapolates to the notion of working together.  
 A more complex understanding of working together comes from Burns (1979), who 
looked at the psychological underpinnings of leadership.  Citing Lawrence Kohlberg’s concepts 
of the evolution of organizational needs, Burns looked at why leaders chose to lead the way they 
do.  According to Burns, Kohlberg formulated six stages of moral development, ranging from the 
preconventional level, focused mainly on the individual’s needs, to the conventional level, where 
conformity and approval, according to Kohlberg, begin to become significant and the concept of 
social order emerges.  Subsequent stages in the postconventional level include principled 
orientation, with the introduction of group norms, shared values, and social transaction or 
contract for overall utility.  This concept of a greater common good is, in fact, another way of 
describing collaboration in a simple sense to the end of achieving a greater common purpose.  
Burns made the important observation that such evolution of need leads to the impregnation of 
moral purpose on leadership, thereby bringing about a higher sense of purpose than the simple 
achievement of goals and aspirations (Burns, 1979). 
 Heifetz (1994) presented a sobering reason for collaboration—survival: 
 
Direction may take the form of vision, goals, strategy, and technique, but on some 
preconscious level, it may simply mean “finding the next feeding site.”  Protection may 




competitor, but basically it connotes scanning the environment for threats and mobilizing 
the response. (p. 69) 
 
Looking at the work of these three authors, one can see already three distinct concepts that relate 
to the notion of collaboration: the pursuit of common purposes, achieving a greater common 
good than that which could be achieved independently, and basic survival.  
Leadership and Alliance Structure 
 Growing from a basic understanding of how collaboration is treated, it is helpful to 
pursue what the literature has to say about strategic alliances.  How do authors present the 
understanding of alliance formation and structure? 
 In Measuring the Value of Partnering, Segil (2004) presented an approach for 
understanding and quantifying the value of alliances.  His work is important in that, being 
published recently, it has the advantage of modern context in the types of relationships, 
geographic complexity, and exigent circumstances that have evolved in recent times.  Segil 
presented the constituencies involved in alliances as five groups:  
1. partners; 
2. management; 
3. external analysts, competitors, and the marketplace; 
4. other functions within each partner’s company; and 
5. the alliances group and the individual alliance manager. (p. xiii) 
 
This initial delineation of constituencies in the alliance relationship provides useful context, 
especially when considering the dimensions of multiculture and asymmetry.  Furthermore, Segil 
presented phases of alliance life cycle, which explain typical experiences of constituencies as 
alliances are envisioned, created, launched, and managed through a point where they are 
successful or undergo reengineering and possible dissolution.  Carefully looking at alliances as 
not simply associations in situ, but living relationships that evolve and with respect to the 




could vary considerably throughout the alliance life cycle.  For example, benefits may accrue to 
one organization in greater proportion earlier in the relationship, resource demands may be 
greater on one of the parties, or risk may be disproportionately assumed by one side of the 
relationship.  When one considers how either party to an alliance may be marginalized, it is 
useful to consider that any of the constituencies can be marginalized and that that inequity can 
shift as the alliance moves through its life cycle.  
 In another work, Kamarck (2003) noted the increasing cross-collaboration between 
government and private sector, citing such examples as homeland security: 
Three key assumptions underlie the movement toward new modes of implementing 
public policy.  First is the assumption that the problems of monopoly, lack of innovation, 
insufficient responsiveness, and inefficiency that plague both the private sector and the 
public sector can be overcome by the injection of greater competition.  Second is the 
assumption that, at the operational level, few major differences exist between 
management in the public sector and management in the private sector.  And third is the 
assumption that the public interest can be articulated and measured and that this will 
create a “market proxy” for the public sector—thus allowing the public sector a new, and 
stronger form of accountability. (p. 106) 
 
 Adding further to the concepts of individual groups, both from public and private sector, 
and the impact of alliance leadership on those groups, Kanter (1994) studied 37 companies from 
11 different geographies, all involved in collaborative relationships.  Her research revealed that 
effective alliance management involved much more than simply managing the legal and financial 
aspects of the relationship.  By carefully focusing on the human aspects of alliances, managers 
were able to gain a significant collaborative advantage. Wrote Kanter, “relationships between 
companies begin, grow, and develop—or fail—much like relationships between people”           
(p. 101).  This focus on the relationship, in addition to the mechanics of the financial and 
structural aspects of the alliance, is key to avoiding marginalization and maximizing the soft 




Active collaboration takes place when companies develop mechanisms—structures, 
processes, and skills—for bridging organizational and interpersonal differences and 
achieving real value from the partnership.  Multiple ties at multiple levels ensure 
communication, coordination, and control.  Deploying more rather than fewer people to 
relationship activities helps ensure that both partners’ resources are tapped and that both 
companies’ own needs and goals are represented. (pp. 117-118) 
 
The intricacies of navigating the life cycle phases of a strategic alliance are exacerbated by the 
challenge of discovering these multiple communication dynamics and maximizing both parties 
benefits from the relationship. 
 Gulati et al. (1994) had another perspective on the interaction of alliance partners with 
one another.  Their study focused on the concept of unilateral commitments.  Likening an 
alliance to game theory precepts (i.e., the prisoner’s dilemma, in which parties have choices, but 
the choices have consequences for themselves and for others), the authors noted that in certain 
successful alliances, one party makes a seemingly counterintuitive and unilateral commitment, 
which advances the relationship in otherwise unachievable ways.  Had each party behaved in a 
risk mitigation mode, doing more or less what they absolutely needed to do and no more, the 
relationship would falter or fail to achieve optimal results.  By contrast, in these unilateral 
commitment situations, the relationship as a whole can achieve significantly greater benefit 
through collaboration.  Gulati et al. likened unilateral commitments to posting a bond.  The good 
faith commitment convinces the counterparty of the sincerity of the other partner and accrues 
benefit to the combined relationship.  Thus, both firms enjoy the full benefit of future 
cooperation.  
Exigent circumstances related to market pressures and signaling to competitors also come 
into play in the formation and execution of alliances.  For example, Itschert and ul-Haq (2003) 
explained that European law guaranteed that, at some point, all of the particulars of the alliance 




agreement without clear articulation of measures that would be taken in the foreseeable future 
would constitute problematic disclosure.  As a result, the formative agreement was intentionally 
left vague.  Itschert and ul-Haq wrote: 
The purpose of the contractual negotiations, then, was not to outline projects that were 
ripe for implementation.  Instead, the two banks painted a rather vague, expansive vision 
of the future, the aim being to demonstrate that they were capable of thinking “across 
national borders” with all due consideration for global implications.  Different scenarios 
were presented as to how—through a mysterious, joint headquarters in a third country—
commercial banking units in all corners of the globe might interact to create a joint 
foreign group, the structure of which would reflect the interests of both partners equally 
and satisfy the needs of the corporate clients of both institutions. (p. 12) 
 
Such an agreement is useful for working within statutory requirements while avoiding 
unnecessary disclosure.  In fact, it also helps create an alliance structure that is not overly 
restrictive.  Conversely, it leaves open the codified statement of intent that can be crucial to 
guaranteeing the contribution, benefit, and process requirements of the collaborating parties.  As 
such, one can see a potential for marginalization of either of the parties in the alliance. 
Rawlings (2000) presented one strategy for mitigating the risks of marginalization and 
sub-optimization.  Through the use of collaborative leadership teams, the author suggested that 
partnered organizations can put in place structures to address the trends of globalization, 
accelerated growth, and continuous reengineering.  Rawlings distinguished between teamwork 
and collaboration, defining collaboration as a much more advanced state of working together not 
simply due to an in-place organizational structure.  The resulting synergies produce substantial 
added benefits to the partnered organizations.  The author suggested that leading through 
effective collaboration is key to addressing the complex demands put forth by significant alliance 
relationships.  
The contributions of these authors can be seen as related, collectively forming a broader 




represent differing constituencies and thus distinct prospects for asymmetry, one can see that the 
evaluation of an alliance could vary from different perspectives.  The work of Segil (2004) 
described useful life cycle phases and constituency descriptors to facilitate such a multifaceted 
evaluation.  To further such an evaluation, the work of Kanter (1994), Rawlings (2000), and 
Gulati et al. (1994) suggested organizational dynamics that could be observed in evaluating the 
success of an alliance and to highlight potential marginalization of constituencies.  Finally, 
Itschert and ul-Haq (2003) presented an example of some of the hidden justification for alliance 
structure that may not be obvious on primary observation. 
Looking at how goals are achieved naturally gives rise to consideration of how one might 
evaluate the success of an alliance.  Thus, one can see the importance of the first dimension of 
this study of strategic alliances—alliance success. 
Alliance Success 
  In “The Way to Win in Cross-Border Alliances,” Bleeke and Ernst (1991) studied 49 
cross-border alliances involving major U.S., Japanese, and European companies.  The study 
found that alliances formed for the purpose of ameliorating weaknesses (i.e., making up for some 
shortcoming) in one or more of the involved parties generally did not succeed.  Other success 
factors, unrelated to size, such as entering into new business or geographic areas and flexibility 
to allow the relationship to evolve, were more important harbingers of success.  Ultimately, the 
authors adopted a definition of success in alliances that involved passing two tests.  First, both 
parties had to achieve their initial strategic objectives.  Second, both parties recovered their 
financial costs.  Bleeke and Ernst were quick to note that these criteria were distinctly American 




longer and less exclusively financial perspective.  Nevertheless, the fact that the authors took 
care to define success and to posit that there is not one single view of it is important to note. 
 Dent (1999) presented a view of success in partnering that provided important 
perspective on a holistic view of partnerships as ongoing relationships.  The author put forth a 
partnership continuum model that encourages looking continuously at a partnership from the 
formative stages through the point at which the parties are fully functioning in a strategic 
relationship.  The author presented excellent tools for assessing readiness to partner, 
understanding differing perspectives and needs, evaluating cultural differences, and even for 
selecting the most appropriate partner.  By focusing on the qualitative makeup of a partnership, 
Dent’s approach lends an important dimension to otherwise entirely metric-based views of 
partnering that tend to sublimate the important human dimension of establishing an effective 
strategic relationship. 
 In addition to considering criteria for evaluating alliance success, Doz and Hamel (1998) 
provided an excellent complement to Dent’s (1999) model in a treatment of preconditions for 
successful alliance activity.  Doz and Hamel looked at the strategic architecture of the alliance 
and noted: 
A useful strategic architecture has a number of features.  First, it is driven by a rich and 
original understanding of the opportunity set available to the firm, not by industry recipes 
and conventional wisdom.  Second, managers who create the strategy understand the 
“profit engine” that drives their business and its underlying assumptions. (pp. 253-254) 
 
The authors also presented a useful table of qualities of firms that are and are not alliance-ready, 
according to their concept of strategic architecture.  Readiness qualities include being creative 
(i.e., forming new ideas), innovative (i.e., making good use of available resources), and focused 




imitative.  Some of these qualities are addressed in Dent’s assessment and are not absolute 
contraindications, so there is a disparity in the two approaches. 
 In a comprehensive analysis of the complete life cycle of a strategic alliance between 
BNP and Dresdner, Itschert and ul-Haq (2003) presented a set of success principles for 
multinational alliances that nicely complement Dent’s (1999) model.  Itschert and ul-Haq put 
forth 16 principles for evaluating success including the presence of specific objectives, a 
mutually agreeable timetable, indivisible management responsibility to named individuals, and 
overt transactional transparency.  It is interesting to note that Itschert and ul-Haq included not 
only these absolute requirements, but also a number of strictures, such as the joint effort should 
not be started until objectives are codified.  
 In addition to ways of evaluating the success of an alliance itself, Gulati (2007) noted that 
it is imperative to look at the performance of the individual collaborating firms: 
Because the influence of other, nonalliance activities on firm performance makes 
empirically linking alliance activity and associated network resources with performance 
difficult, scholars have looked for a variety of direct and indirect ways to test the 
relationship between alliance activity and firm performance. (p. 151)  
 
Some of these indirect ways of evaluation, noted Gulati, include analysis of equity markets’ 
reaction to alliance announcements, though the author is quick to note, “these results provide 
only a prospective estimate of the beneficial consequences of alliances for firms” (p. 151).  
 When considering the evaluation of success in alliances, it is also important to note that 
there are many different types of alliance and, thus, vastly different ways in which success might 
be evaluated based on the nature of the collaboration. Bergquist, Betwee, and Meuel (1995) 
treated this topic after presenting three vastly different types of strategic collaboration including 
a supplier-customer partnership, a public-private collaboration, and a complex, multi-industry, 




Dent’s (1999) continuum model than with Gulati’s (2007) holistic look at the partnering 
organizations.  In summary, the authors focused on aspects of the partnership covenant and goal 
orientation as harbingers of success.  
Asymmetry 
The concept of asymmetry in alliances is typically studied as it relates to other aspects of 
alliance performance.  For example, in one study, Dussage, Garrette, and Mitchell (2004) looked 
at link alliances.  Typical of link alliances are structures where the collaborating parties each 
contribute different skills or resources to the conjoined effort, each according to their 
competencies and going-in capabilities.  Dussage et al. looked at how participation in such 
alliances affects the relative competitive positions of the partnering organizations.  In related 
research (Dussage, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000), the authors found that such alliances are often 
more volatile and lead to one of the parties taking over the joint effort or otherwise dissolving it 
through reorganization.  In their 2004 study of alliances in the automotive industry, Dussage et 
al. concluded that, in such alliances, the relative competitive positions of the partnering 
organizations do tend to change during the life of the alliance. 
Doz and Hamel (1998) commented on the evolution of this volatility: 
Competition between partners was seldom an issue in traditional joint ventures.  In 
market entry arrangements, global and local partners often collaborated, but the local 
partners rarely had global ambitions.  This is no longer true.  Following the example set 
by Japanese companies as early as the 1960s, many local partners now see their joint 
ventures with global firms as stepping stones to new technologies and world markets. 
(pp. 24-25) 
 
The authors noted that the asymmetric nature of the partnering relationship in emerging alliances 
in which a large global partner collaborates with a smaller local partner produces a dichotomy 
whereby the global partner can control markets and simultaneously avoid competition with the 




 Segil (2004) presented a model for assessing the strategic fit in such alliances, which is 
especially useful in dealing with the challenges of asymmetry . The author presented an 8-tiered 
plan for assessing strategic alliances. The 8-tiers address components including: 
• mission, vision, and values; 
• market forces shaping the endemic environment; 
• concerns and opportunities to address the observed market forces; 
• current markets served and products or services offered; 
• respective operating philosophies (including critical success factors and core 
competencies); 
• strategic intent for the potential alliance; 
• short term operational objectives; and 
• how progress will be measured (both operationally and strategically). 
Segil wrote: 
It’s certainly important to look at the strategies of all partners and how compatible they 
are, but strategic fit includes other issues that are not as clear, such as hidden agendas, 
internal cultural beliefs that are hard to find until the partnership is already operational.  
One of the threshold presumptions we have made herein is that each partner has a clear 
strategy, which is rather a large assumption. (p. 45) 
 
Although Segil noted the importance of fully assessing the broad spectrum of impetus for 
alliance as suggested by this model, she also provided the sobering observation that strategic fit 
is a moving target.  Internal organizational changes and external market changes can 
dramatically re-shape the nature of the relationship and, thereby, amplify any asymmetry to the 
point where the alliance only makes sense for one of the parties involved, or even for neither, to 




 Cullinan and Holland (2002) provided data on the changing nature of strategic rationales 
for acquisitions.  The data showed a shift from 1988, when roughly 80% of top-10 acquisitions 
were accounted for by financial engineering and diversification, whereas by 2000, 80% of top-10 
acquisitions were accounted for by business redefinition, scale, and industry redefinition.  The 
shift from less to more strategic intent in these acquisitions was accompanied by a rise in 
nominal value of deals from $80 billion to $600 billion in the same time period.  Cullinan and 
Holland observed:  
In 1988, fewer than 20% of the top ten mergers by price tag reported where highly 
strategic.  This was the era of LBO takeovers such as RJR Nabisco/KKR and 
Federated/Campeau.  In 2000, the era of transformational mergers such as AOL/Time 
Warner and scale mergers like Glaxo Wellcome/SKB, all of the top ten mergers were 
strategic. (p. 27) 
 
This shift to more strategic underpinnings of mergers and acquisitions is testimony that 
companies are finding ways to create synergies that greatly transcend simple financial re-
engineering and market economies of scale. 
 Relating to the concept of strategic asymmetry is a study by Rugman and D’Cruz (1996), 
who looked at strategic asymmetry in concert with credible commitments on the part of alliance 
counterparties.  The authors posited that asymmetry can be effective in three ways: “increasing 
interorganizational trust; increasing the stability of the network; and increasing 
interorganizational learning” (p. 21).  Supporting this tenet is the work of Ring and Van de Ven 
(as cited in Rugman & D’Cruz, 1996), who concluded that lasting relationships were a factor of 
successful transactional history.  Rugman and D’Cruz wrote “owing to the greater degree of 
transaction exclusivity in the business network, asymmetry facilitates easier accumulation of 
transactions and consequently the development of trust” (p. 21).  This accumulation of trust leads 




costs associated with opportunism, monitoring and enforcing agreements, loss of proprietary 
knowledge, etc.” (p. 21). 
Although the studies and writings above look broadly at asymmetry as a component in 
alliance formation and execution, Miller, Fitzgerald, Murrell, Preston, and Rajendra (2005)  
presented the results of an organization development (OD) intervention focused on a specific 
asymmetric alliance between Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Company, a research-based family 
business with a prominent market position in India, and Monsanto, the global giant in transgenic 
agriculture and biotechnology.  Miller et al. described the formation of a functioning alliance 
between the two companies enabled by Monsanto’s purchase of a 26% equity investment in the 
Indian family business and the results of an OD intervention in that alliance.  Although the 
intervention was not entirely successful, the study provides an understanding of the kinds of 
changing dynamics noted by Segil (2004) and benefits of asymmetric collaboration that can 
emerge, as noted by Rugman and D’Cruz (1996).  
Another study by Esteve (2002) presented the dimension of asymmetry in a slightly 
larger collection of five alliances.  The dimensions of asymmetry studied in this qualitative 
research included degree of organizational complexity, centralization of decision-making, and 
leadership style.  Using analytical induction, the author looked at the effects of organizational 
asymmetries on the evolving alliance relationship.  Esteve concluded only an indirect 
relationship between organizational asymmetry and alliance performance.  
Looking at the works of the authors previously cited, common themes emerge related to 
asymmetry.  These common themes include volatility, strategic makeup, and changing 
conditions.  Although asymmetry is not directly called out as a primary descriptor of strategic 




nature of business and market conditions is also seen as driving continuous changes in the degree 
and nature of asymmetry in strategic alliances.  A logical progression of this concept of changing 
business and market conditions is the ever-increasing degree with which organizations 
collaborate across national boundaries. 
Multicultural Makeup and Globalization 
Globalization can be thought of as a backdrop against which the evolution of strategic 
multicultural alliances plays out.  Globalization impacts the multicultural dimension of alliances 
in a neutralizing fashion.  Taken to its logical conclusion, a global economy, transparent markets, 
universal language, and metaphor would vitiate any impact multicultural dynamics have on 
strategic alliances.  Of course, the reality of relationships that take place in business today is 
much different.  In some ways, the world is getting smaller, for example with the relatively easy 
access to transportation, information, and resources.  In other respects, the challenges to complex 
strategic alliances are growing with globalization.  Global alliances are in their adolescence, 
suffering from growing pains and forcing their constituents to react to a pace of growth that is 
historically unprecedented.  Giddens (2003) wrote: 
We live in a world of transformations, affecting almost every aspect of what we do.  For 
better or worse, we are being propelled into a global order that no one fully understands, 
but which is making its effects felt upon all of us. (p. 6) 
 
Giddens (2003) also noted that, although leadership pundits and corporate speech writers 
are quick to use the term globalization, there is not a clear acceptance of what is meant when the 
term is used.  He wrote that diverse thinkers have expressed diametrically opposed perceptions 
about the meaning of globalization in debates and other public forums in recent times.  
Espousing his own view of the meaning and impact of globalization, Giddens opined that there is 




and pace of world economy today.  To support this point, the author noted that, in excess of one 
trillion U.S. dollars is now transacted every single day in global currency markets, a magnitude-
order increase from only decades ago.  Giddens cited byproducts of this rapid economic 
expansion, including the creation of new economic and cultural zones within and across national 
boundaries, referencing examples such as Hong Kong, northern Italy, and an area in northern 
Spain that extends into the geographic boundaries of France.  
Harrison (2006), chairman of JP Morgan Chase, expressed a similar opinion in a speech 
to North Carolina Citizens for Business and Industry: 
Let’s begin with a simple and easy-to-understand definition.  As I am going to use the 
word, globalization relates to “the death of distance.”  It relates to intensified global 
connectedness and the whole raft of changes—economic, social, political and cultural—
that spring from that.  As Tom Friedman declared in “The World is Flat,” globalization 
has “accidentally made Beijing, Bangalore, and Bethesda next-door neighbors.”  Inside 
this accidental, virtual neighborhood, we find that we—as Americans—no longer have a 
lock on many of the best jobs inside the United States.  Candidates from other countries 
are now just a “mouse-click” away. (p. 401) 
 
Of course, this globalization is not without inequity and is in no way uniformly beneficial.  
Giddens (2003) noted that, to many people living outside North America and parts of Europe, 
globalization looks more like expansion of Western ideals and cultures to the rest of the world.  
Harrison’s (2006) mouse-click may, in fact, have the reverse impact, according to others, 
tending to exacerbate feelings of nationalism in collaborative efforts.  For example, Chhokar, 
Brodbeck, and House (2008),  in another GLOBE study of 25 societies around the world, wrote: 
More generally, worldwide immigration during the past century up to today has resulted 
in hundreds of millions of people with different cultural background who work and live 
in close regional proximity.  This trend is particularly apparent in the metropolitan 
regions in which soon 50% of the world population will be living and working.  Another 
sphere where different cultures encounter is the Internet (World Wide Web), which 
provides for an environment of its own, within which people from anywhere in the world 





The authors maintained that, despite the growing instance of multicultural collaboration and 
virtual environments like the Internet, it is not likely that major societal cultures tend to 
homogenize.  The reverse is quite possible, opined the authors, that cultural differences may 
become exacerbated as individuals adapt to globalization while simultaneously striving to 
preserve cultural heritage. 
Relating Giddens’ (2003) observations to the multicultural dimension of alliances, a 
temporal influence can clearly be seen.  As globalization accelerates, any influence from the 
multicultural nature of alliances will be impacted in some proportion.  Thus, a student of these 
alliances should be careful not to make judgments that are static, but rather consider that this 
dimension of multiculture is ever-changing. 
 Beyond the valuable enlightenment that Giddens (2003) provided to an understanding of 
the multicultural dimensions of alliances, there is additional value in what the author has to say 
about tradition.  Giddens wrote: 
No traditional societies were wholly traditional, and traditions and customs have been 
invented for a diversity of reasons.  We shouldn’t suppose that the conscious construction 
of tradition is found only in the modern period.  Moreover, traditions always incorporate 
power, whether they are constructed in a deliberate way or not.  Kings, emperors, priests, 
and others have long invented traditions to suit themselves and to legitimize their rule.  
(p. 40) 
 
Relating this thinking to the dimension of asymmetry in alliances, an interesting dynamic 
emerges.  One can see tradition as an important enabler of inequity in alliances, driving behavior 
and attitude to a norm that may clearly favor one party of the alliance.  Such inequity can create 
asymmetry of power with respect to ability to execute and public opinion, to cite a few potential 
impacts. 
 Steyrer, Hartz, and Schiffinger (2006) performed a series of empirical studies in 




embeddedness in an environment of increasing globalization.  The authors found similar impact 
of what Giddens (2003) would call tradition, and noted:  
Early explanations frequently saw this [a predilection of leadership in the Eastern 
European leadership style to be autocratic] as a result of the so-called communist 
heritage.  This, however, ignores on the one hand the influence of the transformation 
process as a fundamental process of change which may have supported these “stricter” 
types of leadership.  On the other hand, the different cultural backgrounds of East-
European countries compared to the west have been also neglected. (p. 114)  
 
The authors noted that to be effective, alliance participants needed to balance what they called 
local embeddedness, what Giddens called tradition, with the expanded challenges brought on by 
globalization.  Adopting participative leadership styles and other behaviors counter to tradition 
was seen as a critical success factor in responding to the challenges of globalization.  
 If tradition or local embeddedness provides a basis for asymmetry in multicultural 
strategic alliances, one might ask in what ways these asymmetries might benefit complex 
alliances.  Jokinen (2005) performed an extensive review of global leadership competencies, 
seeking to understand what key competencies were closely correlated with success in large 
global endeavors.  She concluded that, while much research has been done to date, little 
empirical research attempts to test the validity of any of the observations.  Research to date, 
noted Jokinen, has been largely constrained to describing, not interpreting: “results from 
previous studies accumulate into a long list of competencies characterized by only minor 
semantic differences of a much smaller number of key competencies” (p. 211).  
 Attempting to be more prescriptive, Barczak, McDonough, and Athanassiou (2006) 
studied over 300 global teams in 230 companies in an attempt to identify specific steps that can 
be taken to meet the challenges of globalization.  The authors concluded that successful leaders 




different cultural backgrounds, living and working in multiple countries, and team members 
participating from different companies on a common project.  
Relating the work of Barczak et al. (2006) to the writing of Jokinen (2005), one can see 
that the former meets the challenges of globalization head-on, almost suggesting a 
homogenization of the team to achieve a common goal, while the latter focuses more on 
understanding differences without concluding any prescription for meeting the challenge.  
Steyrer et al. (2006) uncovered findings somewhere between these two extremes, suggesting 
some change in behavior to be more inclusive and participative in global efforts, but recognizing 
the innate challenges arising from complex multicultural makeup of constituents.  
Kets de Vries and Korotov (2006) summarized the challenge with respect to pan-
European business leadership: 
The new configuration of the EU brings great expectations and considerable anxiety for 
organizations and their members.  On the one hand, it can be seen as an opportunity to 
develop a powerful economic entity with a strong cultural heritage, similar values, and 
enough diversity to foster creativity and innovation.  On the other hand, it brings the fear 
of diluting national identities, clashing cultural norms, religious strife, and 
incompatibility of leadership styles and work practices. (p. 38) 
 
According to the authors, there is a mix of benefit and risk brought about by pan-European unity.  
This mix is analogous to the challenges presented to large, multicultural alliances.  On the one 
hand, there are benefits to the collaborative effort by synergizing.  On the other hand, 
asymmetric relationships brought about by cultural identity, tradition, and differing business 
perspective bring a richness to the relationship that should be leveraged, not driven out. 
 Where globalization is as a theme to the evolution of complex strategic alliances, cultural 
sensitivity can be thought of as a counter-theme that also plays throughout the formation and 
execution of alliances.  Failure to recognize cultural sensitivity, according to many studies, yields 




understand the cultural underpinnings of a relationship in order to maximize leadership 
effectiveness.  For example, Silverthorne (2005) drew learning from Project Globe, an extended, 
mixed-method, multicultural effort to look at leadership and organizational practices in 61 
countries.  Addressing the concept of globalization, the author concluded that leaders need to 
understand the cultural expectations of those in their organization and to validate continually 
their perceptions of leadership in order to adopt the most effective leadership style.  Even the 
definition of terminology, such as participative or autocratic, can have different meaning in 
different cultural settings.  “It is not enough to understand differences in leadership styles 
because the perception an definition of leadership behavior also varies across cultures” 
(Silverthorne, 2005, pp. 96-97). 
 Shonfeld-Ringel (2001) touched on this need to understand differences, focusing on the 
structure of the working alliance itself.  Her work drew on relational theories and empirical 
multicultural sources to look at the structure and definition of the working alliance in a 
multicultural perspective.  Although the term alliances in the context of this study intended more 
the sense of working relationships (as the study had to do with therapists and their relationship to 
clients), the findings are interesting to an understanding of formal, structured business alliances 
in so much as they touch on important factors related to interpersonal relationships in a 
multicultural setting.  The author found specific relational domains of importance in 
multicultural alliances, including empathy, mutuality, power and authority dynamics, the use of 
self, and communication dynamics (similar to the work of Barczak et al., 2006).  “The client’s 
ethnic identity and cultural characteristics, and the therapist’s subjectivity and cultural sensitivity 




for cultural sensitivity is seen by the author, as with Silverthorne (2005), to be a critical factor in 
evolving an effective working relationship. 
Kenichi Ohmae, managing director of McKinsey and Company in Japan, has long 
commented on the state of global competition, evolution of business models, and strategic 
thinking in a complex global setting.  Regarding a particular collaborative event in Japan, Ohmae 
(1991) wrote: 
Managers back at headquarters, experienced in only one way to succeed, are inclined to 
force that model on each new opportunity that arises.  Sometimes it will be the right 
answer.  But chances are that the home-country reflex, the impulse to generalize globally 
from a sample of one, will lead efforts astray. (p. 82) 
 
Conclusion 
As leaders and reflective scholar practitioners, we are called to a high sense of interaction 
as we participate more and more in the kinds of strategic, asymmetric, multicultural alliances 
contemplated in this research.  This literature review has considered the evolution of 
collaboration and how that collaboration is influenced by globalization and the changing face of 
alliances.  Although the literature does not consider alliances simultaneously in light of the 
constructs of this study, each of the underlying concepts is treated by various authors.  The 
choice of constructs for this study emphasizes the changing face of collaboration, looking at 
dimensions of collaboration that will become more relevant as globalization and other factors 
continue to influence the way organizations come together to face business challenges. 
We must consider the influencers of each of the dimensions of the alliances, how we are 
affecting strategies to achieve benefit and avoid marginalization of constituencies.  At the same 
time, we must be conscious that globalization is ever increasing, and the skills that work today 
may not be as effective tomorrow.  Identifying the necessary new skills and realizing broader 




collaboration cannot be simply about immediate organizational benefit.  As the literature 
suggests, other factors are coming into play as organizations work together.  This dynamic 
influences not only the likelihood of success, but also other important, often unintended 
outcomes of organizations coming together to address a common challenge.  The awareness of 
other cultures, the willingness to avoid making generalizations from a sample of one, and the 





Chapter III: Methodology, Guiding Questions, and Research Procedures 
Considering a comprehensive review of research methods in related studies, I concluded 
that there is a strong case in selecting a mixed methods approach for this study.  For my research, 
I used survey and representative multi-case study methods.  In choosing a mixed-methods 
approach, I was careful to consider why such an approach was appropriate.  Lincoln (2010) 
provided an important and relevant reflection on the past decades of qualitative and new 
paradigm research.  Noting the juxtaposition of qualitative research to other methods which had 
previously been held as a gold standard for research and inquiry, the author presented the 
important additive relevance of qualitative methods.  "We have become, largely because of our 
methods, lenses, and paradigms, rather awesome purveyors of some of the most profound 
insights into Western society ever assembled" (Lincoln, 2010, p. 4).   
Survey methods, such as that used in this study for identification of alliances of interest, 
are valuable for understanding the population.  Basic descriptive statistics can be useful in 
understanding observations, as well as (where appropriate), inferential methods for extrapolation.  
Nevertheless, such methods often prevent additional nuanced understanding that can answer 
important questions and lead to the type of profound insights of which Lincoln (2010) wrote.  
Lincoln positioned the importance of qualitative research, "in the past 25 years, the interpretivist, 
ethnographic, and critical community has produced a virtual tsunami of important critical work" 
(p. 4).  I concur that such work is not only relevant, but much needed to understand the nuance of 
human interaction, especially with regard to the kind of complex alliance relationships 
considered in this study.  Accordingly, I have adopted a method which allows for recognition 




for nuanced understanding of day-to-day experiences and insights of leaders in these important 
alliances.  
The first part of this research was intended to expose a number of alliances of interest 
where there is high SAM content.  A survey method allowed interrogation of a sufficient number 
of alliance participants regarding aspects of their alliances so as to provide necessary information 
to position the alliance as either high or low on each of the critical dimensions of SAM.  
Additionally, this method allowed categorization of each alliance as either successful or not 
according to accepted means of assessing alliance success as studied and characterized by other 
researchers (and as indicated by the citations to the survey in Appendix A).  
Survey methods alone, however, would not allow the further study of the nature of the 
alliance experience in successful SAM alliances.  In order to understand the emergent themes, 
influence of SAM characteristics, and impact of leadership interventions, it was necessary to 
balance the discrete, structured survey approach with a detailed and in-depth research technique 
that offers a better understanding of nuance and emotion.  Thus, interviews, a method tool within 
the multi-case study approach were an appropriate method to juxtapose the survey used in the 
first part of the study.  Creswell (2003) wrote of the emergence of mixed methods in modern 
research: “with the development and perceived legitimacy of both qualitative and quantitative in 
the social and human sciences, mixed methods research, employing the data collection associated 
with both forms of data, is expanding” (p. 208).  Figure 3.1 depicts a flowchart of the overall 
methodological approach, showing the juxtaposition of the two methods, performed sequentially, 
contributing to the results of this study.  The survey was used as a tool to identify successful 
alliances and their characteristics.  The results of the survey led to identification of alliances for 





Figure 3.1. Flowchart depicting the sequential application of mixed methods. 
Phase I: The Survey  
The purpose of the first part of the research, the survey, was intended to identify alliances 
of interest and to confirm the relative difficulty of finding successful alliances with high SAM 
content.  The survey was intended to apply a consistent, methodological approach to categorizing 
the makeup and success of an alliance in a way that was scalable (i.e., easily applied to multiple 
alliances) and consistent (i.e., re-assessment of any given alliance is likely to yield a similar 
result).  The purpose of using the survey was also to allow for a way to reach out to alliances 
across the globe, allowing for as broad an array as possible of alliance experience from which to 
draw learning.  Finally, the survey also served as a way to allow alliance participants to 
participate without necessarily self-identifying, an important aspect of the study design. 
Participants.   For the survey, I included as research participants members of past and 
present alliances.  In some cases, I surveyed more than one participant from the same alliance.  I 




the alliance.  In order to increase the likelihood of properly assessing dichotomies in responses 
related to multiculture, I included survey participants from as many countries as possible, as well 
as from organizations of different sizes.  
Those invited to participate were from a broad cross-section of industries including 
pharmaceutical, hospital/medical, high-tech manufacturing, commercial information publishing, 
consulting, white goods manufacturing, financial services, computer/business services, banking, 
legal, entertainment, and media.  Alliances were both for-profit and not-for-profit, in both private 
and public (i.e., government) sectors.  From a geographic standpoint, participants responded 
from alliances in North America, Europe, Asia, Africa, South America, and Australia.  All 
participants were competent in reading and responding in English.   
Procedures.   The survey was broken down into an initial section that captured basic 
descriptive information in four questions about the alliance and the experience that the 
respondent had with the alliance.  This section of the survey also provided space for supplying 
contact information.  Following the initial information, the survey was broken down into four 
main parts, each containing 10 questions.  The four main parts of the survey were dedicated to 
questions about alliance success, alliance strategic makeup, alliance symmetry, and alliance 
cultural makeup.  Each of the four main parts contained 10 questions consisting of a statement 
about the alliance characteristic (e.g., alliance success) and allowed the respondent to indicate the 
degree to which it applied to their alliance.  Respondents rated each item on a four-point Likert 
scale from “Completely describes this alliance" to "Completely contrary to this alliance."  A 
copy of the survey is included in Appendix A.  
Given the findings of my research on the difficulties associated with translating survey 




decision to conduct the survey in English on my prior research which informed my 
understanding of the impact of language on the identification of high-SAM alliances, especially 
any potential lack of clarity or confusion that ensued.  Volunteers with various mother tongues 
including English (British, American, and Australian), Japanese, Chinese (Mandarin and 
Shanghainese), Malay, two Indian dialects (Hindi and Tamil), and Spanish did not have any 
significant difficulty with the survey in the form used.  Translating the survey for non-English 
speakers was not an attractive option.  Translation brings about a host of additional 
considerations in terms of nuance, semantic ambiguity, and generalizability of results. 
Data collection.  The final survey instrument was constructed using Zoomerang®, an 
online survey tool owned and operated by MarketTools, Inc.  The survey was sent via email link 
to approximately 220 individuals.  The participants fell into three categories: alliance participants 
known to me or to colleagues of mine, members of an association of alliance participants, and 
others who became known to me as part of my research.  Of the 220 potential respondents, I 
received 131 complete responses, resulting in approximately 60% response rate.  Respondents 
were allowed to take the survey anonymously in order to encourage participation and assuage 
any concerns about privacy.  Accordingly, it was not possible to audit completely those invited 
to participate against the responses received, however, due to the nature of general questions 
asked at the beginning of the survey, it was possible to confirm that no individuals took the 
survey multiple times.  Fifty-five individuals chose to self-identify.  The tool was set up in such a 
way that it was not possible for participants to submit an incomplete response.  During the 
administration of the survey, I monitored responses on a daily basis to confirm that I understood 
the rate of walk-away (i.e. potentially incomplete) accesses to the instrument to reach a level of 




Data preparation.  To facilitate analysis of the survey data according to the intended 
SAM stratification, I constructed a synthesis tool using Microsoft Excel®.  Figure 3.2 shows a 
version of the tool.  
 
Figure 3.2. A custom-developed tool to interpret and vet the survey results. 
As surveys were received, I transferred the results from the Likert scales into the tool 
using a simple conversion of 4, 3, 2, 1 corresponding to the survey form read from left to right.  
In this way, higher numbers represented higher ranking on the scale used (ranging from 
“completely describes” to “completely contrary”).  This conversion was performed via data 
extract from the Zoomerang® tool directly into the spreadsheet to eliminate any errors in 
transcription.  As an aid to error-detection, I used conditional formatting to color top-two boxes 
(“completely describes” and “somewhat describes”) green and bottom-two boxes (“somewhat 
contrary” and “completely contrary”) red.  This color coding gave me an instant visual 
representation of the preponderance of top-two boxes during data entry.  The tool also 
automatically tabulated a raw score for X (success), S (strategic makeup), A (asymmetry), and M 




than 50% top-two boxes for all three dimensions of S, A, and M, or “NOSAM” otherwise.  
Sample formulas are included in Figure 3.2 to show how these computations were made.  Thus, 
any row that shows “SAM” would be in the gold box of Figure 1.4.  Furthermore, the tool also 
appended a “+” for greater than 50% top-two boxes for success characteristics and a “-” 
otherwise.  SAM indices of “SAM+” therefore relate to the gold-box green markers indicated in 
Figure 1.4.  These are the alliances of interest to me. 
This approach is for stratification only.  I was not attempting to measure that one alliance 
has a specific amount of content in any one dimension, only that certain alliances have more 
overall association, by simple observation, with what is thought to be relevant characteristics.  
This method is only for purposes of isolating those alliances of interest.  Figure 3.2 shows how 
the tool I constructed allowed me to easily and consistently identify those alliances. 
Data analysis.  To understand the population surveyed and the preponderance of 
successful, high-SAM alliances, I used basic descriptive statistics.  Seventy-six percent of 
respondents reported that their alliance was still in effect.  The range of longevity of alliances 
was broad, from 6 months to over 30 years.  The mean alliance duration was slightly over 6 
years.  Respondents indicated involvement with their alliance an average of 4 years, with the 
least involvement being approximately 6 months and the most involvement being 30 years.  
Forty-four percent of respondents had been involved with their alliance since inception.  
Phase II: The Multiple Case Study 
For the second part of my study, I interviewed up to five individuals from each alliance 
identified as successful and with high SAM content.  The purpose of interviewing more than one 
individual from each alliance was to triangulate on emerging themes from differing perspectives 




Participants.  As I am multilingual, I did not limit participants in the interview part of 
the study to English speakers though all interviews were ultimately conducted in English.  I also 
did not limit my interview participants to the initial survey participants; rather, I used the survey 
to highlight those alliances from which I solicited interview participants.  Furthermore, I 
interviewed individuals from both sides of the alliances studied in order to allow for triangulation 
within each case study.  I paid close attention to situations where individuals interviewed 
disclosed others whose perspective was important to an understanding of the alliance.  Most 
interview participants were consistent with my expectations that they would be at mid- to higher-
organizational levels (e.g., alliance manager, CFO, legal team, marketing or sales manager), 
allowing for a broader perspective on the alliance (in particular with respect to SAM 
characteristics).  Table 3.1 depicts the role characteristics of interview participants for each of the 
interview participants: 
Table 3.1 
Role Characteristics of Interview Participants 
 
   Alliance        Senior Leaders         Technical Mid-Level     Analytical Mid-Level 
      (e.g., VP, Director,   (e.g., Developer,  (e.g., Finance, 
   Chairman)        Scientist)       Research) 
 
Alliance 1       3    1    1 
 
Alliance 2       3    0    2 
 
Alliance 3       3    0    1 
 
 
Procedures.  Interviewees were solicited in three ways.  First, those who self-identified 
from the survey were contacted and requested to participate in an interview.  Second, additional 
parties were identified through discussion with initial participants and through references that 




they would be willing to participate in the research.  Finally, through researching the alliance, 
additional parties were identified and contacted.  In all cases, interview participants indicated 
their agreement to participate in advance via signed informed-consent, which included a 
description of the research, potential risks to participants, and stipulation of the intent to respect 
confidentiality.  All interviews were conducted over a 6 month period.  
Regarding the specifics of the interview, I established a template indicating specifically 
what questions were to be asked.  An exemplar is provided in Appendix B.  Interviews were 
conducted according to this template.  I provided clarity where terms were poorly understood.  
The questions were not necessarily asked in the specific order of the interview template, as in 
some cases the interview participants had thoughts that took them naturally to a different 
dimension of the interview.  Interview participants were free to stop the interview at any time, 
though all willingly chose to complete the process. 
Data collection.  Where clarification was required due to native language considerations, 
I provided that clarification during the interview with specific individuals as needed to drive 
consistency of interpreted meaning.  In all cases, the participants had language skills that were 
more than sufficient to conduct the interview comfortably.  The interviews were recorded to 
facilitate transcription.  Participants were reminded at the beginning of the recording process that 
the interview was being recorded.  Interviews lasted from 30 to 60 minutes each. 
Data preparation.  After conducting the interviews, I obtained a transcript.  The 
transcript was checked against the audio recording, especially for places where technical jargon 
or accent may have made it problematic for the transcriptionist to understand the recording.  
Based on the transcripts,  I coded the interview content, treating the entire interview as a unit of 




practices required to protect privacy for research.  Recordings did not contain the name of the 
participant.  Digital recordings provided for transcription were identified with a code known only 
to me.  To ensure consistency of method and quality of results, I engaged independent, skilled 
individuals adept at thematic coding to perform similar coding.  This team served to provide 
validation of the conclusions and inform a broader perspective where appropriate.  Prior to 
engaging in any coding, all coders took part in training to ensure consistency of coding method.  
The approach was consistent with Boyatzis (1999), who put forth elements of what constitutes a 
good thematic code, how the code should be labeled and defined, and steps to be taken to 
eliminate possible confusion on the part of coders.  After initial coding was done, follow-up 
training sessions were held with all coding team members as an added measure of consistency.  
Another function of the coding team was to challenge the use of any industry-specific wording or 
other jargon, ensuring that fuller meaning was derived from the experience.  Coding was done 
with each coding partner taking all of the transcripts for one particular case.  Coding produced 
categories, sub-categories, and themes.  Categories and sub-categories were created by looking 
within the coded transcripts for a particular case at terms which were coded that had the same 
general (category) and specific (sub-category) meaning.  Themes were derived from groups of 
categories that had a common understanding when taken together.  After the coders and I 
completed initial coding, sessions were held to challenge codes derived and ensure consistency 
of meaning.  Themes were assessed only within the system of each individual case and only after 
initial discussions to ensure consistency in understanding.  Taking my coding and the coding of 
these individuals together, I assessed emergent themes and enriched my understanding of 





Data analysis.  In presenting the cases that are part of my multi-case study, I have 
provided context for the case, describing key aspects of this case to orient the reader.  My intent 
is to ensure that the reader understands the positioning of the case in the gold-box (Figure 1.4) 
described as successful, high-SAM alliances.  Ultimately, the multi-case study establishes 
triangulation in three key dimensions, perspective (in that all alliances are successful, high-
SAM), method (via the survey scoring and resulting stratification), and data (looking at available 
information such as corporate charters, mission statements, and relevant demographic or industry 
data).  Furthermore, the context and findings from the survey were used in conjunction with the 
interview data and overall context of the alliance participants to inform my final interpretation. 
Ethical Considerations 
There are a number of ethical considerations that are an important part of this study 
design.  I took significant precautions to protect the identity of survey participants.  No 
information was ever permanently printed that included participant names or any other 
identifying information.  All correlation between survey results and participant names was via an 
alphanumeric key assigned to the survey participants and known only to me.  Nothing was 
printed at any time, even during analysis of the survey instrument, that correlated participant 
names to the method used to ascribe the alphanumeric key.  All survey data were kept in 
password-protected locations.  I also added encryption of stored data in order to facilitate a 
retention strategy for a number of years after completion of the study.  
In addition to protecting the identity of study participants, it was also critical to protect 
the names of the partnering organizations.  Accordingly, no reference to organization names or 
other identifying information is part of the published results.  Where necessary, I made reference 




information only for the purposes of facilitating an understanding of the research findings; but in 
all cases, took care to protect the identity of organizations. 
In order to further protect individuals and to level-set expectations of privacy, I used 
informed consent with all research participants.  Both the survey and any invitation to participate 
in an interview were accompanied by complete disclosure of the nature of this research and the 
intent to provide discretion with regard to protecting the names of people and organizations 
involved.  
The findings of this study may be troublesome to the individuals or organizations studied, 
particularly with regard to conclusions as to the efficacy of leadership interventions in SAM 
alliances.  Accordingly, I took care to keep any conclusions or observations isolated from names 
or other identifying information that may relate to people or partnering entities.  
The application of a mixed methods approach provided a robust set of data to study 
successful, high-SAM alliances.  The alliances identified via survey and subsequently studied in 
the multi-case study present a broad array of collaboration experience, from a traditional 
collaboration to leverage the synergy of the alliance relationship to significantly more complex 




Chapter IV: Findings 
This chapter presents the results of the survey and multi-case study.  The findings will be 
presented in two parts.  First, I will present the findings of Phase I, the survey.  The survey 
provided rich data from which to select alliances of interest for multi-case study.  The second 
part of the findings will be those from Phase II, the multi-case study.  In the multi-case study, I 
have positioned the partnering organizations and the work of their alliances to demonstrate the 
impact of each of the dimensions of SAM in their relationship and within the system of alliances 
studied.  
SAM Characteristics in the Alliances 
According to the method of assessment described above, I populated a spreadsheet tool 
with the results of the 131 alliances.  Fifty-five alliances had complete SAM attributes (i.e., a 
preponderance of “completely describes” or “somewhat describes” for each of the groupings of 
10 questions relating to strategic, asymmetric, and multicultural alliance content).  Of those 55 
alliances with SAM attributes, 49 were SAM+ (also a preponderance of “completely describes” 
or “somewhat describes” for alliance success) with the remaining six being SAM- 
(preponderance of “somewhat contrary” or “completely contrary” for alliance success). 
For the alliances that were not fully SAM alliances (i.e., one or more of the three 
categories did not meet the threshold of having a preponderance of positive responses), I also 





Alliances Missing One or More SAM Attributes 
 
 Alliance Attribution    # of Observations 
 
          S only      8 
         A only      0 
         M only      0 
        SA only                47 
        SM only      3 
       AM only                10 
 
 
These results show a relationship among the SAM characteristics, given that most of the 
possible sub-combinations were not observed (with the exception of SA in isolation, which 
occurred 35% of the time).  This analysis suggests that it was the multicultural dimension that 
most often prevented an alliance from being fully ascribed as SAM. 
Focusing on SAM+ Alliances 
A subset of the 49 SAM+ responses, representing the alliances of interest, is included in 





Figure 4.1. SAM+ alliances results. 
I also looked at the characteristics particular to the body of SAM+ alliances.  The average 
length of existence of these alliances was 7.3 years, with 10 of the alliances ranging from 10 to 
30 years.  Eighty-one percent of the SAM+ alliances are still in existence.  Survey respondents 
for the SAM+ alliances had an average of nearly 5 years longevity with their partnering 
organizations.  
In order to isolate possible alliances for the multi-case study, I focused on those alliances 




participation in this study.  Further sharpening my focus to alliances where I had no current 
involvement led to the selection of the three alliances included in the multi-case study.  
Case Studies of Three Successful SAM Alliances  
 For the case studies, I interviewed individuals from both parties to each of three alliances 
characterized by the survey as in the specific area of focus.  Given that the participants were 
geographically dispersed, including participants in Asia, Europe, and North America.  The 
diverse organizations involved in these alliances include management consulting, banking, 
systems development, large-scale enterprise software, insurance claims processing, and the 
protection of natural resources globally.  As such, this collection of alliances is quite eclectic in 
goals, aspirations, and cultural identity of the individuals involved.  That diversity 
notwithstanding, each of these strategic alliances has enjoyed a significant measure of success in 
the presence of a manifest multicultural makeup and great differences in access to resources and 
size of partnering organizations. 
Naming Conventions in the Alliances 
For the purposes of the multi-case study, I have adopted a naming convention to facilitate 
reference to partnering companies and individuals while respecting the identity of those people 
and organizations.  There are three alliances, which will be consistently referred to as alliance 1, 
alliance 2, and alliance 3.  References within alliances will be prefixed by a single digit number 
to keep clear the alliance being described, so the partnering organizations will be referred to as 
company 1.A and company 1.B, the organizations for alliance 2 will be company 2.A and 
company 2.B, and the partnering organizations for alliance 3 will be company 3.A and company 
3.B.  Interview participants will be referred to using the sequence P1.1, P1.2, P1.3, and so on for 




respectively.  To further protect individual identity, in all cases, participants are referred to with a 
masculine pronoun, despite their actual gender.  Figure 4.2 shows a schematic of this overall 
naming convention. 
 
Figure 4.2. Alliance nomenclature. 
Alliance 1—Learning Together 
The alliance between company 1.A and company 1.B was formed over 10 years ago to 
jointly provide better services centered around claims processing in the insurance industry.  The 
partnering organizations began with a simple fee-for-service relationship and grew that 
relationship by continuously learning from each other.  The formation of this alliance was 
against the backdrop of an insurance industry that was healthy and growing.  Company 1.A was 




claims  processing.  At that time, the information technology (IT) industry was grappling with 
the introduction of distributed computing platforms, new development environments, mounting 
security concerns, and the emergence of the Internet as both technology enabler and force 
multiplier for competitors of both partnering organizations.  Company 1.A currently employs 
nearly 1,000 individuals, primarily centered on relationships with a large network of insurance 
companies and repair facilities in the U.S., with some penetration in Europe.  A conceptual way 
of looking at company 1.A would be a growing U.S. company with U.S. roots serving a mostly 
U.S. client base in an established network.  
Company 1.B was introduced to company 1.A initially as a source for developers who 
could aid in company 1.A’s software development, particularly Year 2000 (Y2K) software 
remediation efforts.  Like many companies at the time, company 1.A was faced with either 
remediation of potentially millions of lines of computer code, some of it developed years prior 
by long-gone developers, or rapid systems replacement in order to ensure ongoing business 
operations at the turn of the millennium.  The individuals who supported the systems and 
developed new software at company 1.A knew their environment well.  Some of them did not 
want too much help from the outside, a possible disturbance of the status-quo, but times were 
tough, and the pressure to produce perfect results in Y2K remediation were mounting.  Company 
1.B was possibly exactly what company 1.A was looking for: a source of developers familiar 
with the Y2K problem who would not ask too many questions and who would focus on getting 
the work done efficiently and rapidly, then leave things more or less the way they found them.  






Interview Participants from Alliance 1 
 
 Alliance Participant    Description of Role 
 
  P1.1   Senior leadership at company 1.A.  Involved in the  
     formation of the initial relationship between company 
     1.A and company 1.B. 
 
  P1.2   A developer in the support organization for company 1.A. 
 
  P1.3   An analyst for company 1.A.  Came to the company after 
     the alliance was already formed.  Oversees a key part of 
     the relationship with company 1.B. 
 
  P1.4   Director for a mainframe-based development team at 
     company 1.A and a consulting group responsible for 
     claims technology.  No longer with company. 
 
  P1.5   Very senior executive at company 1.B.  Has been involved 
     with the alliance since inception. 
 
 
P1.1 summed up the relationship: 
Part of it was based on some past experience on the success side, but it was building that, 
you know, more-than-just-a-vendor relationship, which in this case was with an off-shore 
company.  So it was challenging from the fact of the cultural difference, particularly the 
Indian culture is a very—you know, “say yes” culture for lack of a better term. 
 
P1.1’s focus on building the strategic relationship and recognizing cultural differences from the 
start was central to his description of the alliance.  He saw immediately that the two 
organizations differed mostly in terms of culture.  Size, experience, and even knowledge of the 
systems and problems involved were not top of mind central to his recollection. 
P1.1’s counterpart in the alliance formation, P1.5,  summarized the initial relationship 




Essentially all of the relationships that we get into are strategic relationships, in our 
model; the model that [company 1.B] operates in, we are a high-value provider, rather 
than a cost-based provider; we’re a value-based provider.  And for a value-based provider 
to be truly successful, these relationships have to be long-term and strategic, because in 
the short term you cannot prove value, right?   
 
Based in India, company 1.B had a very different makeup.  Senior leadership in the company 
identified with Indian culture, having grown their business in the country and established 
themselves as a provider of outsourcing, consulting, and related services to overseas entities.  
The senior leadership, and many of the experienced practitioners, were quite used to operating 
with different cultures.  To P1.5, the immediate challenge was the strategic dimension of the 
relationship—finding the right value proposition and making sure to deliver on that value.  That 
value proposition included senior level consultants with a broad base of business knowledge, 
industry subject matter experts with a high degree of specific experience, and a multidisciplinary 
pool of developers and other consultants, which could be expanded and contracted to meet client 
needs.  Adding value immediately, to be seen as a valuable partner in the relationship, was top of 
mind. 
Positioning this alliance as successful, high-SAM.  Although all of those interviewed 
agreed that alliance 1 was successful, they had differing perspectives on the reasons for success 
and the degree of success in this alliance.  Those in the less senior positions tended to comment 
on the availability of differing resources willing to work hard, while senior leaders focused more 
on the character of the relationship.  P1.1 was quite philosophical, stating, “Sometimes success is 
defined by failures that you can get past, so it’s things where you’ve had some issues with your 
work; you work through them.”  He told of many hours spent working through lessons-learned 
sessions and various subtle, and not-so-subtle ways of influencing the teams to work together for 




outcome by flying to India for the singular purpose of meeting face-to-face with P1.5 to discuss 
mounting concerns with a U.S. onshore project manager.  P1.5 was so impressed with the gesture 
that he was able to swap out that project manager to another client where his style could be more 
effective, substituting an individual whose style was far more effective with company 1.A’s 
culture.  This ability to learn from “failures that you can get past,” as P1.1 put it, was a recurring 
theme in the relationship of these two organizations learning to work with each other.  P1.5 
talked about this same concept of learning together from his perspective: 
Something like this can fail in the blink of an eye, if the leadership believes that this 
won’t work—the fine gap between working and not working, and leadership just saying 
that this doesn’t work, so I think we have to look back, and be thankful to the leaders who 
really put their careers on this, and said that this will work.  We will make it work. 
 
Ever reflective, P1.1 also spoke of another recurring theme with regard to success, 
namely actions taken by one party to the alliance which primarily benefit the other party without 
any clear return on the investment in time or resources in the short term.  Said P1.1: 
With this particular partner, I did speak at a couple of their global conferences, gave case 
studies of things that we were very successful at, and was willing to talk to their clients 
on the same behalf, and they did help us with a couple of clients.  I can’t say that it 
necessarily resulted in new business, but they were certainly willing to put in a good 
word and say, hey, we’re working with this company; they’re very good in this particular 
space, and they knew of them. 
 
Others mentioned this same theme from their perspective, noting that work was done with no 
anticipated benefit to one’s own organization, solely for the benefit of the other organization and 
the relationship itself.  The willingness of alliance participants from company 1.A and company 
1.B to reciprocate like this was often cited as a characteristic of their successful relationship.  
 There were other views of the success for the relationship, ranging from longevity (the 
relationship continues to this day) to mutual growth (revenue from the relationship for company 




line).  Speaking of the original Y2K effort, which was the first successful mutual endeavor, P1.4 
took a very practical, output-based perspective: 
The Y2K work went exceptionally well.  I think Y2K did not exactly explode in 
everyone’s face like a lot of people thought, and we were certainly in that group.  We 
invested a lot of time and money in making changes, and testing changes, and [company 
1.B] was core to that; I mean, they made them [the software changes] all.  They tested 
them all.  They coordinated the whole effort.  I was kind of our conduit on the [company 
1.A] side.  It went without—basically without a real hitch.  I mean, as I recall, there were 
a few procedural issues, as we went through the first few days after Y2K, where we were 
being so cautious that we forgot to turn things back on, and things like that.  But there 
were no coding issues, so yeah, that project went particularly well. 
 
This common view of mutual success was in no way seen as a given.  P1.2 put a fine 
point on his contention that both parties worked very hard at the relationship, also introducing 
another interesting dimension.  P1.2 noted that line-level employees at company 1.A did not feel 
in any way threatened by the consultants from company 1.B, so the help was welcome.  He 
disclosed that he later worked with P1.1 at another alliance where the goal was elimination of 
headcount, and in that relationship there was far greater contention and a much less common 
perception of alliance success.  
Views on asymmetry were unanimous in the perception of the size of the two 
organizations.  Company 1.B had significantly more employees and much more global reach.  
How individuals saw the manifestations of asymmetry varied, however, from initially being 
surprised to note the existence of it to having accepted the asymmetry from the onset as an 
underlying characteristic of the relationship.  P1.3 focused on the relative sizes of the two 
organizations, noting that it should be much easier to staff  a project quickly from a larger 
organization.  He cautioned, however, that such an asymmetry is not always an advantage (i.e., 
more is not necessarily better).  Said P1.3: 
I think in the end, the quality of the resources outweighs the number that you have, 




much more junior than we’d been getting in the past, and it seemed like work that was 
done had to be sent back more than once just because it wasn’t up to par. 
 
P1.2, who had a much more tactical role and was working side-by-side with the consultants from 
company 1.B saw the same asymmetry in organizational size more clearly as a benefit: 
We had some smart people, and all that, and that’s nice, but we didn’t have people that 
were going to give 120 percent, like they did.  I mean, they had some really smart people 
that they put on our account, some young guys that were just, you know, running full 
blast right out of the gate, that would work—it seems like day and night, not only to fix 
problems, but to go further than that, to make sure that we were impressed.  And they 
probably had people like that all over the world that they could tap into now and then 
when they needed it. 
 
This asymmetry clearly had manifestations of multiculture embedded in it.  All 
participants commented on multiculture as an underpinning of the relationship.  P1.5 
demonstrated a very mature, objective evaluation of the cultural differences: 
It was, very clearly [company 1.A] was a [regional] company, based in [state], very, very 
[state]-heritage, and run by a second generation Indian, but he was probably as [regional] 
as anybody else with a team under him who was highly [regional], and working with an 
American company which had very senior level management, which was American, but 
most of our factories were in India, and the culture between what the factories had, and 
what [company 1.A] had was essentially integrating a very Indian culture with a very 
[regional]  culture, and Indian meaning in the factories at that point they were small, and 
we were a small [company 1.B] at that point with all Indian culture, blending that with 
the [regional] culture.  
 
This blending of culture, as P1.5 put it, came up over and over in participants’ descriptions of the 
working relationship.  Participants commented on learning about the other culture in unexpected 
ways, for example when noting the social integration challenges the Indian consultants 
experienced when working in the U.S. for the first time.  Alternately, several participants from 
company 1.A commented on how their perspectives were broadened when they first traveled to 
India as part of the execution of their alliance role.  P1.4’s recollection is typical of this learning: 
I’ve told this story probably 100 times since the first day I went to [city], India and met 
with them, but we were there, and we were having some sort of a problem, and it was 




used, but I must have said something like, you know, “We’ve got to get this done by 
morning,” or “We’ve got to get this done before we go home tonight,” and I was 
speaking very casually, not really thinking about what I was saying, and we [the team 
from company 1.A] went back to the hotel.  We came back the next morning, and all 
these guys are looking pretty haggard and all wearing the same clothes, and I was like, 
“What are you guys doing?”  It’s like, “Well, you said we couldn’t leave until we figured 
this out.”  We kind of very casually say things, and they take things pretty literally, for 
example.  
 
This vignette is one of many shared by participants where some remark was made casually, 
resulting in largely unintended reaction due to what was perceived as a failure to anticipate the 
impact of words, gestures, or expressed emotions.  Participants all reflected on these incidents as 
learning—building on future interactions that could be more predictable and, hopefully, less 
mutually stressful.  
Themes emerging from leader interviews.  Participants talked often of leadership 
interventions, particularly to maximize benefit of the alliance and lessen any negative impact of 
cultural-based misinterpretation.  This and other key themes for all alliances are summarized 
below in Table 4.3.  For example, P1.5 talked about ensuring mutual understanding, stating:  
Insuring that there were no losses in translation between these two teams was critical, 
because although both these teams were speaking English, the supplemental and the 
nonverbal communications could be significantly different, which is where an 
expectation could be communicated to somebody.  Emotional response that they saw 
could mean one thing in India, and could mean something else in [the U.S.].  Bridging 
this was very, very important.  We put in a sequence of steps to be able to bridge the 
cultural gap that existed.  We realized very early that the cultural gap existed, and put in 
multiple sequence of trainings of programs, of integrated projects to insure that the 
cultural gap was minimized.  It could never go away; but the main thing was to 
minimize it. 
 
Recognizing that this cultural difference existed and was not something to be eliminated, rather 
learned from, was a critical realization shared by most participants.  Various stories were shared 




this difference, embraced it, and put in place programs to help both sides learn from each other 
was seen as a critical success factor and a running theme throughout the alliance relationship. 
P1.2 saw another theme that was common to other participants, namely a focus on the 
customer.  In this case, one party to the alliance putting crucial focus on the satisfaction of the 
other.  P1.2, who saw day-to-day examples of customer focus, recalled, “They made sure that 
they understood the customer, and they wanted to understand the customer better than me.”  P1.5 
saw this same concept of customer focus in a more bi-lateral way, noting that each side focused 
on what they did best.  P1.5 recalled: 
We each focused on what we could do well.  Very clearly, we would never be able to 
focus on the supply chain, the supply chain of the transaction, of the claims processing 
that would require a full-time job.  It was an organizational job; [company 1.A] did that 
well.  They had the sorts of people who understood it; they had relationships with their 
clients who could give them the right feedback to continue to enhance that experience.  
What we could bring was that we had enough people who could understand what they 
needed to do, and tell them what foundation can enable them to do that. 
 
Others saw the theme of customer focus in a more or less bilateral way, with those in more 
tactical roles seeing mostly the benefit of the other party focusing on them while the more senior 
leaders perceived a more bi-lateral focus, where each party focused on the other in ways that 
mattered most to drive benefit to the alliance.  
Relating behaviors, interventions, and styles to outcomes in this alliance.  Stemming 
from the focus on each other, another recurring theme that participants related to the outcomes in 
this alliance was that of trust.  This and other key themes for all alliances are summarized in 
Table 4.3.  Participants saw the evolution of mutual trust as a critical success factor.  P1.1 talked 
about this evolving trust:  
It starts with an element of trust between a couple of people and it spreads, that there’s 
something between—they’re kind of working it out and I think with any alliance it might 
be two sales people that are working on it, or a new business guy and something else, but 




company that they knew and trusted someone and they trusted the words enough to say, 
that okay even when it wasn’t going great, we know the intent was there.  We’ve got to 
keep working through this, and we’re going to make it work.    
 
All participants spoke of evolving trust in the relationship, from the first handshake to the 
ultimate unmitigated success of this ongoing relationship.  Those who had a position that was 
more likely threatened by outsourcing expressed more difficulty developing this trust, while 
senior leaders saw the development of mutual trust as an objective in and of itself.  
Conclusion.  The alliance between these two organizations continues today.  After many 
years of working together and learning together, these two organizations have found mutual 
benefit and a strategic relevance in each others’ business future.  Many of the alliance 
participants have moved on.  P1.1 has a senior role in another organization where he is the 
provider of outsourced services instead of the consumer of them.  He talks fondly of leveraging 
the learnings of alliance 1 in his new role, giving him a much more holistic perspective on this 
type of alliance.  P1.5 has stayed with company 1.B and enjoyed mounting success, built on the 
learnings of relationships like alliance 1.  Other participants have stayed with their organizations 
or retired.  All of them look at this alliance as a part of their working career where they learned, 
sometimes despite their intentions, and grew in ways they never expected.  
Alliance 2—Hunting Together 
Very different from alliance 1, this alliance was loosely formed as a joint go-to-market 
strategy between two very strong and prominent companies over 20 years ago.  The alliance 
continues today.  The nature of the relationship has always been for company 2.A and company 
2.B to find and exploit new market opportunities by leveraging their respective capabilities.  
Both companies are ever on the lookout for new customers and new opportunities with existing 




to business expansion.  During difficult economic times, business focus shifts to helping 
customers find ways to reengineer to be more lean and to ensure they are taking fullest advantage 
of any existing market opportunities.  Because there are many firms, large and small, hunting in 
this space, a critical success factor is the ability to find key partners and build strategic alliances.  
Like hunting in the woods, a group of parties with mutually synergistic skills can much more 
effectively pursue and ultimately capture the big prize.  By leveraging each others’ capabilities, 
company 2.A and company 2.B are able to find and exploit opportunities much more effectively 
than they could operating independently.  
Company 2.A provides management consulting and related services.  Those services 
include integration assistance with software like that offered by company 2.B.  As part of 
company 2.A’s consulting, they help clients not only to get the software up and running in an 
efficient and timely manner, but also to take full advantage of organizational and operational  
reengineering, to optimize IT infrastructure, and to reap other benefits that come with such 
implementations.  
The implementations themselves are the domain of company 2.B.  Focused on delivering 
a high-quality software product, the company’s services are primarily directed toward getting 
their product configured and running as designed.  They look to company 2.A as an outlet for 
helping consumers of their product to tackle more complex problems of reengineering and 
optimization.  Company 2.A and company 2.B have formed a mutually-beneficial relationship 
through specialization without exclusivity.  Each of the partners has always had similar alliances 
with other parties (company 2.A with other software vendors and company 2.B with other 
consulting and integration partners), so the strategic nature of the relationship was challenged 




partnership seemed to be up to the alliance partners themselves to determine through word and 
deed. Table 4.3 outlines the interview participants from Alliance 2.  
Table 4.3 
Interview Participants from Alliance 2 
 
   Alliance Participant    Description of Role 
 
 
 P2.1   Has worked on both sides of the alliance, as senior leadership at 
    company 2.A and in a senior sales position at company 2.B.  Has 
    also worked as a customer for both organizations and for a 
    competitor of both organizations. 
 
 P2.2   A senior member in a sales and delivery function for company 2.A. 
 
 P2.3   A consultant who worked in an entry-level role at company 2.A.   
    P2.3 has received extensive training in the products and services  
    offered by company 2.B. 
 
 P2.4   A project financial controller for company 2.A.  P2.4 has deep 
    visibility to the cost/value relationship as well as discussions that 
    take place at the senior level of client engagements regarding 
    staffing, risk mitigation, and profitability analysis. 
 
 This author  Participated as an employee in this alliance more than 10 years  
    ago.  Has had no direct involvement since. 
 
P2.1 described the relationship from his perspective, which was unique in that he has 
worked for both sides of this alliance, as well as in roles where he was a customer of company 
2.B, both with and without other consultants assisting in implementations: 
[Company 2.A] is a [key alliance partner] to this partnership; there are multiple tiers, 
based on investment and training of personnel that understands the product, and the 
breadth of functionality in the product, and the breadth of projects that are out in the 
marketplace drives our organization to have a very large bench of people who need to 
understand the product to be able to service all the opportunities in the account.  There 
are varying tiers of partnership, if you will, and the [premium] partnership would be the 
highest level, which is the most amount of training, the most people that trained at the 
largest organizations. 
 




organization to assist in implementations worldwide.  Like a good tour operator, who relies on 
the existence of excellent hotels, reliable transportation, and a knowledgeable base of expertise 
to deliver an excellent experience for clients, company 2.A relies on company 2.B, the 
manufacturers and distributors of IT infrastructure, training programs to learn the nuances of 
company 2.B’s software, and a talented pool of consultants who consist of IT specialists, 
software specialists, business generalists, project managers, and others as needed to support 
complex implementations.  A conceptual way of looking at company 2.A would be a large U.S. 
multinational company with presence in many countries, having grown progressively from its 
U.S. roots and U.S. management culture. 
 Company 2.B is a European company with strong national influence in management 
style, communications, and concentration of employees.  P2.5 described the relationship from his 
perspective as looking for three qualities in a partner, what he calls “the push, the pull, and the 
marquee reference.”  In his model, company 2.B is looking for a partner relationship where each 
party drives revenue for the other by virtue of client relationships.  Company 2.A pushes revenue 
to partners via implementation-related consulting services.  They also pull revenue from the fact 
that partners are helping to recommend their software solutions.  Finally, company 2.B looks for 
marquee partners who actually use company 2.B’s software, serving as reference accounts by 
virtue of the fact that they demonstrate the benefits of best practices associated with using the 
software.  According to P2.5 and P2.1, this type of complex relationship is difficult to find in a 
truly effective balance of trade, but not impossible.  For company 2.B, there are multiple alliance 
partners who exhibit these traits to varying degrees, hence their scheme for stratification of their 
alliance partners into tiers, whereby the most beneficial terms are afforded to those partnerships 




 P2.1 described this same multifaceted relationship using the analogy of a triangle: 
We go to market with them, and share information, and help them implement their 
product, and we’ve made a significant, significant investment, and that’s the primary, I 
think, focus of this conversation.  The other two sides to the triangle are that we happen 
to run our entire business on their product, our purchase from them over the years of 
their products is over [large sum].  And the third side of the triangle, is that they do a 
very, very insignificant amount of business with us, buying from us, buying the services 
that we offer to help them streamline, optimize all the things that they need to do to 
continue to grow and develop their organization. 
What P2.5 described as a very strong three-sided relationship, P2.1 described as a triangle with 
one very underdeveloped side, that being revenue that accrues to company 2.A from selling 
services to company 2.B.  This imbalance of trade was cited by other participants as a key 
difference in the complex relationship between the two organizations.  Figure 4.3 depicts the 
two different perspectives of this alliance relationship. 
 
Figure 4.3. Two different perspectives on the alliance relationship. 
Positioning this alliance as successful, high-SAM.  This alliance has been in existence 
for decades.  Initially, leaders from company 2.A saw the relationship as a way to grow 




software was designed to help companies go to market more efficiently, control investments in 
working capital, develop customer-facing commitments, optimize strategic sourcing of 
resources, and enable financial cost accounting.  In prior instantiations of software, these types of 
functions were discrete, autonomous packages that were pieced together in a complex tapestry 
that required great expertise to achieve any real business benefit.  As software became more 
complex and integration modalities became more prevalent, multifunctional software like that 
offered by company 2.B became more and more prevalent.  As the software available was still 
not a panacea, the requirement for consulting skills like those of company 2.A simply matured as 
companies struggled to integrate more and more business functionality and the information 
produced by the enterprise and the marketplace continued to grow at unprecedented rates. 
 The strategic nature of alliance 2 was characterized by participants as based on creating 
synergies in the ability to go to market from a strong united perspective.  P2.1 summarized the 
strategic relationship: 
What we really try to focus on, or focus their teams on is what we call “strong/strong.”  
The best opportunities we call “strong/strong relationships,” which is where we have a 
strong relationship with the client, and [company 2.B] has a strong relationship with the 
client, and then together we can push these opportunities over the top.  The second tier is 
where one of us is strong, and the other is to some degree less than strong, maybe weak 
or something in the middle, and then finally, sort of the green field accounts are where 
we’re weak, and they’re weak, and those types of accounts really aren’t worth the 
executive team spending a lot of time on.  
 
Participants were unanimous in characterizing the Alliance 2 relationship as successful, 
not only in terms of longevity, but also in terms of financial benefit, mutual brand enhancement, 
sales efficiency, and other factors.  Participants often cited the benefits of the two companies 
working together for a common good on behalf of their shared customer.  Said P2.1: 
We’re super partners.  We often say that we’ve got to be big boys and girls here, and 
that they’ll be times when because of the client, some predisposition with the client, we 




client is the one that has to make the decision, and any magic things that we do and say 
and wave our hands fast, and talk really loud, don’t necessarily mean the client is going 
to make the decision for [company 2.B’s product]. 
 
P2.4 had a more relationship-based view of the same concept, noting that at most times, 
company 2.A would be in the client-facing situation, representing company 2.B’s product.  The 
success of the two organizations working together was in their ability to negotiate the 
relationship in a way that gives the client what they need for their business, not necessarily what 
they ask for.  Said P2.4: 
From the perspective of what the client’s looking for, what the long-term and short-term 
objectives are, and what the outcome that actually is going to satisfy the need is 
[company 2.A] was a translator for that.  So [company 2.B] wouldn’t be at the table, and 
I mean it’s like the cartoon where, you know, the Henry Ford thing.  It says “If I gave 
them what they asked for, they would have gotten faster horses!” 
 
The concept of access to the client and understanding their needs was also a common 
theme among participants when discussing asymmetry.  The nature of who enjoyed first contact 
with the client was often determined by pre-existing relationships, clients proactively inquiring 
about the software, joint go-to-market efforts, and other factors.  Initial access notwithstanding, 
company 2.A always enjoyed far greater exposure to the client once the initial software purchase 
was completed.  That asymmetry of access was juxtaposed by an asymmetry of product 
knowledge.  The product was developed and maintained by company 2.B, so they would always 
enjoy greater product knowledge, despite significant effort on the part of company 2.A to invest 
in training and other discovery activities to remain highly skilled and knowledgeable.  P2.4’s 
depiction of translator was very poignant in this regard given that often company 2.A had far 
greater client knowledge due to their access asymmetry, yet was often in a position of translating 
between needs of the client and functionality of the product, which was obtained from their 




Two participants also noted that this asymmetry of access to the client presented a kind of 
asymmetric risk profile.  Company 2.A had the primary client-facing relationship, so they could 
be aware of disfavor on the part of the client and potentially shift focus to product functionality, 
design, or other aspects outside their control.  Participants were quick to note, however, that such 
a strategy would be short-lived, as the relationship between company 2.A and company 2.B went 
far beyond any individual implementation.  P2.3 discussed another nuance of this asymmetry of 
risk, noting that the client might possibly be predisposed to favor company 2.A in any situation 
where product functionality was remotely a factor since individuals from company 2.B were 
simply less familiar to them.  None of these risks were new to leaders from either party to 
alliance 2.  They spoke of taking active steps to maintain mutual transparency as a mitigation 
factor and a critical success factor in the longevity of the relationship.  In some relationships, 
company 2.B actually adopted a posture of requiring a seat at the table in key steering 
committees and other bodies as a form of active mitigation of this type of risk. 
Perhaps the biggest asymmetry of all in alliance 2 was multiculture itself.  Participants 
from company 2.A were united in their view that company 2.A, although multinational in the 
scope of its offices and client project locations, was primarily led from the U.S., with a U.S. 
corporate culture.  Company 2.B had a very strong national culture influence in business style 
from a particular European country.  Participants noted that culture permeated many aspects of 
the way that company 2.B conducted business, including communication style, response to 
pushback on key decisions, and flexibility in considering alternative opinions regarding future 
software modifications.  P2.4 noted that company 2.A exported its culture to a degree by placing 
primarily American expatriates in positions in Europe where they had a high degree of contact 




also admitting that attempts to artificially shift the cultural demographic by bringing individuals 
into roles solely on a bases of their cultural identity would bring about other issues if company 
2.A were not focused on getting the right person for each role, regardless of their country of 
origin.  P2.2 took a very personal perspective on multiculture in the alliance, maintaining that 
one can only control one’s own behavior.  Said P2.2: 
The guys who run our practice or alliance with [company 2.B], they have counterparts at 
[company 2.B], and the current guys in charge, I think, both understand the cultures and 
the organizations, and can work through, issues, I think, really well.  And they do, 
especially when things get sticky.  But there’s lots of other leadership within our firm 
who don’t really understand these guys, and I don’t think they ever will.  If they park 
their ego at the door sometimes, and try to listen a little bit and understand their culture, I 
think that it would help them. 
 
Company 2.B was very aware of the multicultural dichotomy as well, although 
participants from that side of the alliance tended to downplay the impact of cultural difference on 
any client-facing outcome.  P2.1, who worked for both organizations at different times, felt that 
the multiculture impact was definitely prevalent, but less overt.  Said P2.1, 
I would say it’s just below the surface, though, and there have been lots of articles about 
this balance of power where the power was going to be, and there was a gentleman that 
was located out of [U.S. location of company 2.B], and there was some talk about the 
Americanization of their company, and there was a lot of pride in authorship or of 
building of this product, and now the pendulum appears to be swinging back to the 
[European country] ownership, leadership, and so it’s been an interesting pendulum 
swing between the organizations. 
 
P2.5, who is more focused on sale of the product than delivery, noted that most of the 
contact between the two organizations in a pre-sale capacity is at the regional level.  Because the 
two organizations tend to staff regionally for sales positions, it seemed to P2.5 that the 
multicultural dimension was far less of a factor than during implementations, when the two 




Themes emerging from leader interviews.  Working together often produced what 
several participants called a “healthy tension.”  This and other key themes for all alliances are 
summarized in Table 4.4.  From the perspective of company 2.A, there were tensions relating to 
the dichotomy between selling a product to do the right thing for the client and finding a way to 
implement the specific product produced by company 2.B, which was arguably configurable to 
the point where nearly any rational functionality could be achieved.  From a unique role that was 
embedded with the consulting team, but more focused on project financials and plan 
deliverables, P2.4 clearly felt the frustration, noting also that the client played more than a 
passive role in creating tension.  Said P2.4: 
I always saw frustrations on what people were getting versus what they were promised, 
and I don’t understand exactly why that communication broke down unless it had to do 
with client access or requirement clarity or even if  the clients weren’t able to express 
what it was that they actually needed.  You don’t actually want to replace a like for like.  
You want to get something a little bit better.  If you don’t have so much, you can’t 
visualize what that might look like and what might work.  So that’s difficult to do. 
 
P2.2 explained that this type of tension was often exacerbated when the software did not function 
as perceived, forcing company 2.A into a position of having to defend a product that they 
actually did not have the direct ability to change.  
 Related to the concept of healthy tension was the theme of advocacy.  Several 
participants talked about the need for advocacy, for example on behalf of the client when 
company 2.A would need to discuss product changes with company 2.B or on behalf of company 
2.B when company 2.A would propose how to best use the software to meet an unmet need.  
P2.4 noted that it was not always clear how to advocate in such situations, and it was not nearly 
as simple as maximizing near-term benefit for one side or the other.  Said P2.4: 
I don’t think it was about winning out.  I think it was about how do you define the 
problem and how do you attempt to solve it.  You can solve things with process that 





P2.1 saw this need for advocacy as an end-to-end responsibility for the client relationship: 
I've spent the past eight or nine years servicing all aspects of what the client could be on 
one of those many implementations of this product.  Again, the most common theme in 
the alliance, and the partnership is owning the customer relationship. 
 
As a result of the healthy tension and the need for advocacy, the leadership of the client, 
company 2.A and company 2.B resorted to what P2.2 and others referred to as matrix 
management—the formation of steering committees and other bodies to mitigate such risk 
through transparency and unanimity of direction to the cross-functional project teams.  Alliance 
participants from company 2.A had a related policy that extended to the client, whereby shadow 
resources were placed in key roles for the client, providing that the consultant could only be 
perceived as successful if the analogous client in that key function was also assessed as 
successful.  This temporary joint leadership in key roles was seen by many as a critical success 
factor, not only in delivering project results, but also in ensuring a common leadership message.  
P2.5 summed up the leadership behavior from the perspective of project teams: 
They want to be brought up to speed on what our focus is going to be so there is a 
common message that started at the top and driven all the way down that includes local 
engagement and training and making sure that when we talk to a prospect, there’s a 
common theme that’s being talked by both parties. 
 
 The commonality of message did not always ensure that there was mutual trust.  Another 
common theme among participants was the need to engender and nurture mutual trust between 
company 2.A and company 2.B at all levels of the relationship.  This need for honesty 
transcended the entire sales lifecycle, from selling behavior to delivery and execution.  For 
example, speaking of the sales cycle, P2.2 said: 
You’ve got to have honesty in these relationships, because no matter, you lie once, or 
they lie once, and you know, it always comes around, and the other person will find out.  
Even though sometimes the discussions are tough, there may be an account where I have 




whatever reasons.  I try to be up front with my counterparts in [company 2.B], and say, 
“Hey, listen, my firm is recommending your competitor on this particular account, you 
might as well go out and go work with one of the other firms.”  We have that kind of up-
front, brutally-honest kind of relationship. 
 
P2.4 recounted a situation related to trust in the middle of the delivery cycle.  On a particular 
project, the software had been initially installed and was in the process of being configured to 
meet the client’s needs.  As is customary, the client appointed a senior leader to oversee the 
implementation from a business perspective.  It was generally understood that this leader did not 
have any product-specific experience, but that such experience would be provided by a shadow 
resource appointed by company 2.A.  In this case, the client leader did not begin the relationship 
from a position of trust in the company 2.A senior leader, adopting a posture that he could lead 
such a project without assistance due to his deep company knowledge and the strength of his 
team.  P2.4 recounted how this leader was quite embattled until his trust was won over by the 
resource from company 2.A, who also had a critical stake in the success of the project.  
Relating behaviors, interventions, and styles to outcomes in this alliance.  Nurturing 
of trust and common messaging was in fact a theme of leadership intervention thought by many 
participants to be a critical success factor.  From the initial client engagements, where one party 
or the other would necessarily have the client entrée, to mature relationships fraught with risk 
and complex communication dynamics that necessarily included more alliance participants from 
company 2.A, the necessity of managing the behavior that both alliance partners be transparent 
was seen as crucial.  
Stemming from this concept of transparency was a related theme of linguistic sensitivity.  
P2.1 noted that a particularly effective intervention was the introduction of a default language. 
Nearly all alliance-facing participants from company 2.B spoke English and the reverse was not 




counterparts, so company 2.B pressed for an English-only policy to demonstrate solidarity with 
their U.S. partners.  The policy required that if anyone in the room, or entering the room, spoke 
only English, the spoken language was required to be English.  P2.1, who worked at company 
2.B at the time and is a self-proclaimed “non-polyglot” stated that the policy was very well-
received as a gesture to demonstrate solidarity between the two companies.  
Conclusion.  P2.1 summed up the success of alliance 2, hunting for just the right 
opportunities, learning together what works and what does not at the most fundamental levels of 
the day-to-day interactions of the two alliance partners.  Said P2.1,  
The real strength of the relationship ultimately needs to be – it lives or dies in the field at 
the very low levels, where the people who are working with the account share or assess 
the value of the partnership for that particular opportunity [emphasis added]. 
 
Like hunters in a deep forest, surrounded by risk of all kinds, success and death lying just outside 
or just within reach at any given moment, these two companies continue to search for that 
particular opportunity together. 
Alliance 3—Together to Make a Difference 
At times, commercial gain and market positioning seem trivial in the face of an aspiration 
that is bigger than any of the parties trying to address it.  Such was the case for the parties in 
alliance 3.  This alliance was formed with specific goals relating to the sustainability and use of a 
natural resource, not only from the standpoint of environmental impact, but also in consideration 
of people who live in very poor conditions, depending on the exploitation of that resource to 
survive.  By finding a proper balance between conservation and effective management, the 
parties in this alliance hoped to achieve social impact, to foster environmental benefit, and to 
inspire the implementation of sustainable policies that would live long beyond the life of the 




organizations and alliances existed at the time which, for political reasons, commercial 
considerations, or contention over shared resources, opposed the formation and evolution of the 
alliance partners in alliance 3.  Like many efforts that involve environmental and social impact, 
there would be no absolute public mandate.  Opinions and actions of others, sometimes working 
at cross-purposes, would have to be considered.  The work of this alliance involved finding ways 
to influence government and non government entities and the formation of public and 
commercial policy while managing the sources and uses of funding to derive the maximum 
benefit over as many geographies as possible.  Table 4.4 outlines the interview participants from 
alliance 3. 
Table 4.4 
 Interview Participants from Alliance 3 
 
   Alliance Participant    Description of Role 
 
 
 P3.1   A very senior member of company 3.A, P3.1 is also a co-founder  
    of alliance 3. 
 
 P3.2   A key researcher for company 3.A.  Areas of direct leadership  
    include baseline assessments in the major areas of alliance focus,  
    including industry analysis, private sector research, market   
    analysis, and identification of global trends. 
 
 P3.3   The coordinator for the alliance from company 3.A.  Each party to  
    the alliance had co-chairs.  The co-chairs, in turn, had coordinators, 
    who managed the day-to-day work,  maintained the development  
    of cooperative activities, and provided oversight of necessary  
    reporting. 
 
 P3.4   The coordinator for the alliance for company 3.B. 
 
 
P3.3 saw the alliance as primarily a vehicle for making funding available to undertake 




and restoration of resources.  According to P3.3, the majority of the funded efforts fell into the 
first two categories, though policies helped encourage restoration after the dissolution of the 
alliance.  By working with field offices around the world, appropriate projects were identified 
through collaboration with local individuals familiar with the needs and realities of each 
geography served. According to P3.3, the work of the alliance was as much about identifying and 
vetting the proper opportunities, as it was about the day-to-day management of targets and 
metrics to demonstrate to investors that funds were having the intended impact.  P3.2 also spoke 
a lot about targets and the need for benchmarks to make sure that the alliance was focused in the 
right place.  Because nothing of this scale had been undertaken previously, it would be for the 
alliance not only to define success, but to capture the hearts and minds of the constituencies who 
made funding available to understand and to believe in these targets as not only meaningful, but 
realistic.  
P3.1, by the characterization of several participants, was the visionary who saw a path to 
implement sustainable change and to make others believe in that path as the right one.  As with 
any monumental task, the parties involved needed a catalyzing leader who could have the right 
balance of vision, charisma, integrity, and humility to allow strong constituents to collaborate in 
a way that could be successful in such a global undertaking.  Company 3.A was well positioned 
to deliver the knowledge and strategy, and P3.1 saw that opportunity and took up the mantle of 
leadership for this worthy cause.  According to P3.1, his objective was to improve the 
environmental impact of loss of resources, while also realizing significant social benefit to those 
who lived in areas rich in the resource.  P3.1 noted that statistics show the world’s poorest 




thus impacted not only by resource depletion, but also by the commercialization of their regions 
by industry.  Said P3.1: 
We set ourselves up three targets, and the targets were meant to be catalytic, right?  So, 
what we were trying to do was to spur others to action, to create [resource rich] areas, to 
bring threatened [resource] areas under effective management, and then, thirdly, to bring 
those [resources] that were being used for [commercial use] under better management as 
independently certified by third parties.  And my particular role in it is that I was the 
founding co-chair of the alliance. 
 
Like many charismatic leaders, P3.1 did not project an air of superiority or narcissism, rather one 
of a person with a clear vision, who saw what needed to be done and, undaunted by the enormity 
of the task or the plethora of naysayers, went on about finding a partner to deliver the vision. 
 Company 3.B was exactly the partner that he needed.  Where company 3.A was primarily 
focused on conservation, company 3.B was primarily focused on alleviating poverty through 
funding and stewardship of meaningful projects around the world.  Company 3.B had been 
focused at the time on refuting public opinion that they did not consider environmental impact in 
achieving their goals, so it seemed that the two parties had found in each other a partner that they 
sorely needed.  Eloquent and truly reflective about the formation of the alliance, P3.4 spoke in 
terms of the multifaceted aspirations of the alliance.  Said P3.4: 
There were two main advantages from [company 3.B]’s perspective of making this 
alliance.  The first one was that under this [resource preservation] strategy, [company 
3.B] wants to give a lot more attention to protected areas, to be conservative of 
biodiversity, watersheds, etc.  And [company 3.B] has very limited field capacity for 
investigating those sort of issues.  By contrast, [company 3.A] has personnel set in 
probably [large number] different countries, and a lot of their work has to do with 
protected areas, conservation of biological diversity, etc.  So, they brought [company 
3.B] in that perspective, and they made it much easier for [company 3.B] to get into that 
business, and that’s been quite important. 
 
P3.1 talked about this same “business” from the perspective of company 3.A, stating: 
A big part of the reason why [company 3.A], wanted to engage with [company 3.B] is 
because [company 3.B] was a major driver of development, and in developing areas 




richest, and most dynamic [resource-rich areas], so we wanted to influence the 
development pattern that was going on in those countries, in and around these natural 
areas, so [company 3.B] was a key source of finance, and policy drivers in those 
countries, that historically had had devastating consequences for the environment, and the 
natural world. 
 
While alliance partners often need to engage in advocacy and discovery to determine if the 
alliance is right, it seemed to parties on both sides of this alliance that any questions of fitness of 
their counterparty were asked and answered from the start.  
Positioning this alliance as successful, high-SAM.  While the appropriateness of 
working together seemed easy to defend, the work of the alliance and the success of their effort 
were in no way guaranteed.  Because success depended in large part on getting local constituents 
to change policy and in some cases to forego short term benefit for longer term good, the 
challenges to success were daunting.  P3.1 noted that by the time the alliance was dissolved, 
giving way to sustainable grassroots programs and follow-on activities that continue to this day, 
several of the major goals were significantly exceeded.  Among the achievements of the alliance 
were dramatic improvements in the availability of protected resources, and the implementation 
of programs for sustainable management to prevent the achievements from decaying again after 
the alliance moved on to other areas of focus.  The impact of these sustainable efforts was not 
only on the environment, but on people who depend on the land and its resources for their very 
survival.  Said P3.1: 
The source of water for someone in the mostly poor, irrigated agricultural lands in the 
world have their origins within [resource rich] areas, right?  So, if you degrade the 
[resource rich] areas, and you’re [depleting the environment through commercial use of 
the resource], you shut off the water pumps that are critical for feeding agricultural 
systems that literally feed tens of millions of people around the world.  And so, we said 





Through the careful documentation of the work of this alliance, P3.1 is able to show sustainable 
programs that exist on several continents as a direct result of this kind of careful attention to 
resource management and sustainability. 
 Participants all felt strongly that this success was achieved only through the strategic 
alliance of company 3.A and company 3.B.  Either party alone would not have had sufficient 
resources or capacity to affect change.  P3.1 was quick to point out that collaboration between 
the two organizations alone was not sufficient.  Said P3.1: 
A third piece of it is that neither one of us could be successful alone, or together without 
also building local buy-in.  So, we actually had to convince leaders in developing 
countries to join on with our agenda, but we also had to build local constituencies in 
those places so that it would be viable for the leaders to make these changes. 
 
In this way, alliance 3 was like an alliance of alliances, requiring that in each place where the 
two organizations strived to affect change, they were compelled to form relationships with local 
leaders and local constituencies. 
 The strategic nature of the alliance was in many ways synergized by the deep nature of 
asymmetry in the alliance.  Indeed, both parties brought a portfolio of capability to the table that 
was vastly different from their counterparty.  P3.3 summarized the asymmetry in terms of 
resources that could be brought to task.  According to P3.3, company 3.B had a primary 
advantage in what he called "convening power," in other words, they had the organizational clout 
that when they called a meeting, people came—important people.  According to P3.3 and others 
interviewed, what company 3.A brought to the table was public trust and brand.  People had (and 
continue to have) a very positive opinion of company 3.A.  Additionally, company 3.A had what 
P3.3 called “boots on the ground”—skilled individuals in localities that mattered who could 
bring relevant knowledge to bear in short order.  Company 3.B could get people to listen and 




company 3.B was made up of very differently-skilled individuals who “rarely get mud on their 
boots.” 
 The multicultural aspects of this alliance, though seemingly evident in the vast 
geographies involved, were illusive to for participants to discuss.  Though both organizations had 
a myriad of multicultural influence, neither company 3.A nor company 3.B identified solely with 
a single national identity.  In the case of company 3.A, the national identity was evident at the 
local level where the organization focused on local involvement which naturally identified with 
national culture.  In the case of company 3.B, the multicultural makeup of the organization itself 
tended to homogenize any influence to the point where participants had difficulty explaining it.  
P3.3 noted with some sarcasm that global organizations like company 3.A and company 3.B tend 
to operate on what he called “global standards of international engagement, same as the UN 
agency, so there tends to be a sort of standard of international bureaucratic culture.”  P3.3 went 
on to explain that multiculture, in the sense of influence from a particular geography, did play a 
role in the execution of the alliance.  Said P3.3: 
In countries that don’t have a long history of stewardship and management the emphasis 
may be on creating new [resource protection areas].  A good example would be DRC, 
right?  The Democratic Republic of Congo.  Compare that to Poland.  Poland has pretty 
much known for a couple of hundred years where its protected areas were going to be.  
They used to be royal states, and now they’re national parks, but compare that to 
Liberia or something, and it’s a quite different situation.  So, naturally, the activities and 
emphasis within the three target areas of [resource] management, conservation 
protection, and restoration, naturally reflects the socioeconomic circumstances of the 
regions, and that’s why input from regional colleagues was important, and culture is 
certainly a component of that, but I wouldn’t say it’s the dominant component.  
 
This depiction of the myriad of multicultural influence was echoed by P3.2, who maintained 
that company 3.A had likely dealt with many of the multicultural issues that would influence 
the organization long before this alliance was formed.  Thus any national influence came from 




either of the partnering organizations.  P3.1 put a fine point on this position, stating, 
“Multiculturism defines the essence of both institutions in their own right, and it magnifies 
several fold when you bring the two into an alliance.” 
Themes emerging from leader interviews.  Those interviewed were united in the 
articulation of a common theme, that of thinking globally while acting locally.  This and other 
key themes for all alliances are summarized below in Table 4.5.  Said P3.1: 
Our big successes were largely built on our ability to influence national leaders to adopt 
our agenda, and to make it its own, so the ability to generate local ownership at the 
highest levels that also then has that supported by some kinds of grass roots 
constituencies.  That’s key, right?  So, getting the local buy-in from top to bottom in the 
countries where we operate clearly was a recurring theme. 
 
This concept of local buy-in from top to bottom was supported by P3.4, who gave an example, 
stating: 
In [country], [company 3.B] had about ten somewhat troubled joint [resource]  
management projects, and these were situations where they got the government, and the 
local communities around the table, and they told us how collectively in partnership they 
could do a better a job of managing [resource], than if the government did it on its own, 
and we’ve pumped a lot of alliance 3 money into supporting those joint [resource] 
management arrangements, they’re called [industry term] and that’s had quite a positive 
impact. 
 
This example of taking a troubled strategy and reinvigorating it through local 
empowerment and buy-in relates to another theme that was cited by participants, the concept of  
developing and nurturing the adoption of best practices from one part of the world in other areas 
of the world where the same approach could prove beneficial.  P3.1 exemplified this concept, 
stating: 
There’s a number of examples of where we were able to catalyze things that wound up 
having shelf lives that extended beyond the life of the alliance, itself.  And so, we also 
had a number of other organizations then adopted the targets that we had set out, and so 
even though the alliance is no longer in operation, you still have organizations out there 
pursuing the agenda, and the targets on [resource management] that were instigated and 





These best practices, clearly laid out and codified, have thus become the work of others, allowing 
the alliance to live on even though company 3.A and company 3.B are no longer directly 
involved.  
 Clarity of intent also played out in another common theme among participants:  
meticulous attention to metrics and objective measures of success.  P3.3 cited several 
quantifiable targets of the alliance that were clearly understood by all parties.  When these targets 
were met, it was clear to all involved.  P3.1 and P3.4 quoted almost verbatim the same 
quantifiable targets, exemplifying the common vision that parties from both sides of the alliance 
had on this complex undertaking.  This clarity of vision also played out in what several 
participants cited as an unambiguous mandate that permeated the organizations.  P3.3 talked 
about access to any level in his organization, which was otherwise quite hierarchical, with 
regards to the work of the alliance.  Said P3.3: 
[Senior leaders] believed in the alliance and wanted to see it achieve things, and that 
message trickled down to all those intermediate levels of management, and it made 
opening the vice president’s door, or the department director’s door, or the regional 
group’s door, a hell of a lot easier. 
 
This clarity of vision at all levels of the alliance permeated out to the constituencies 
served and involved in the targeted regions.  P3.1 cited an example where a conservation effort 
was disregarded in a locality as being merely a showcase effort by foreign parties, having no real 
sustainable local impact.  Rather than objecting to this characterization, P3.1 and others asked 
local officials to help define how one could measure real, sustainable local impact.  By working 
together to clarify the intent, all parties involved were able to adopt standards that allowed the 
alliance to move ahead and work together, with clarity of objective, toward a common goal P3.4 




The ideas of what needs to be done come genuinely from the local communities, 
themselves, so there is now in place, and in the process through this [resource 
management program], and that includes collaboration with alliance 3, and then 
everybody else, but instead of having just one discrete program with alliance 3, we now 
have this sort of much broader partnership, which so far seems to be making a useful 
contribution.   
 
Relating behaviors, interventions, and styles to outcomes in this alliance.  Through 
common vision, local empowerment, inclusion, and leveraging of their collective capabilities, 
leaders in this alliance were able to achieve significant, sustainable results from a joint effort that 
lasted less than 10 years.  The long term impact of this alliance, which ended over 5 years ago, 
continues today.  The passion and conviction of all those involved is compelling in ways that are 
difficult to describe.  Participants all articulated belief in the work of the alliance as having 
transcendental benefit well beyond the interests of company 3.A and company 3.B.  
Conclusion.  When asked for some of the more memorable results of alliance 3, P3.1 
talked continuously for several minutes, almost without hesitation, ticking off in his mind a list 
of accomplishments, any one of which would normally seem to be the work of scores of people 
over many years.  That awe-inspiring list of accomplishments of the alliance, coming from 
leaders intervening at local levels with global vision, largely through combinations of local 
knowledge and leveraging of best practices, clearly demonstrated the achievement of great 
results.  In one country, leadership intervention with local government resulted in protecting 
some of the most vulnerable ecosystems in the country while preserving the livelihood of local 
communities.  In another country, a fund was created that allowed debt restructuring in exchange 
for the local governments investing in the protection of resources.  In yet another country, heads 
of state from several surrounding regions were brought together for a regional summit on 
sustaining resources, setting an agenda for future conservation efforts.  In other parts of the 




alliance have stories to tell.  Some told of conflict, all told of closure with great environmental 
and social impact.  These two organizations formed an alliance almost two decades ago to make 
a difference.  The echoes of that collaboration continue today as some of those leaders are 
retiring after amazing careers and others move on to change the hearts and minds of others still. 
Examination of the Three Cases 
Looking across these three alliances from the perspective of SAM, there are aspects about 
them which make them very different.  Although each alliance is characterized as successful, 
high-SAM, it seems the alliance experience has evolved for very different reasons and in very 
different ways.  One way to see this evolution is to look at the strategic makeup of the alliance 
over time.  Alliance 1 began as a relationship that was not at all strategic, with company 1.A 
simply looking for a low cost provider of good quality work.  The strategic nature of the work 
that they would come to do together evolved as the two parties learned together how to work in a 
more strategic way.  In alliance 2, the initial relationship might be characterized as “trust but 
verify”—both parties had similar alliance relationships with other organizations.  While their 
initial relationship was seen as strategic, they leveraged the power of the alliance over time to 
attract better business than either party could achieve with other relationships.  What made 
alliance 2 ultimately successful was possibly the fact that it simply worked better than other 
alliances, or possibly that there was simply too much to lose for the parties involved not to do 
business with each other.  Finally, in alliance 3, there was a strategic relationship from the first 
minute of the two parties coming together.  Parties on both sides of the alliance readily admitted 
that they could not have been remotely successful without the skills and resources of their 
counterparty.  Like all of the alliances studied, the relationship improved over time, but it started 




4.4 depicts a conceptual representation of the evolution of the strategic relationships in these 
three alliances over time, using the same gold-box metaphor discussed in chapter 1. 
 
Figure 4.4. Conceptual trajectory of alliance strategic makeup over time. 
There are other ways of looking at the three alliances that bring about additional 
divergence in the makeup of the alliances with respect to SAM.  For example, the way in which 
alliance participants described working together was vastly different.  Observations in this regard 
fall into what is called the humanistic plane in Figure 1.4: the plane bounded by multiculture and 
asymmetry.  It is in this area of SAM that interpersonal and intercultural interactions manifest.  
In alliance 1, it seemed participants needed to learn about each other much more than they 
needed to learn about the business at hand.  Parties on both sides of the relationship had a solid 
grasp of what needed to be done initially; the relationship was admittedly as much about getting 




as the parties learned about their respective cultures, learned how to express disagreement and 
changes in management directive, and learned how to let each party bring value to the table.  
Alliance 3 was much like alliance 1 in this regard, though for different reasons.  Leaders 
from both organizations were very clear from the start what they needed from their counterparty.  
What they needed to discover over time was how best to use the value each party brought to the 
table while mitigating political and other endemic risk at the level where the alliance touched 
local counterparties.  In effect, what they needed to learn was something they needed to learn 
together, each time they took on a new project or entered a new geography. 
Rather than learning how to work together for optimal results, the parties in alliance 2 
realized quickly that a critical success factor was to let each other own their own space, 
maintaining transparency and a degree of autonomy, while working together to hunt as a team.  
Behaving like a team meant establishing mutual trust, even if that trust required periodic 
verification and was at times challenged by other parties outside the alliance.  Most notable in 
the balance of the relationship for the parties in alliance 2 was the customer dynamic.  Where 
projects were going well and benefits were plenty, it seemed the relationship went very well.  
When customer issues arose, the test of the strength of this alliance was in fact the degree to 
which the parties could work together as a team and not weaken their alliance by 
suboptimization in favor of either party. 
As different as the three cases are in terms of makeup, strategic evolution, scope of value 
added beyond the alliance participants, and other factors, there are indeed ways in which these 
three cases expressed similarity.  One compelling way to see this similarity is to look at the way 
in which participants talked about cultural differences.  In all cases, regardless of the 




the alliance.  That learning manifested itself differently in different parties to each alliance, as 
well as in the alliance relationship overall.  For example, in alliance 1, it was clear that parties on 
both sides of the alliance needed to learn to work with each other, respecting cultures and 
leveraging the best that each had to offer.  In alliance 2, the multiculture was perhaps always 
there, but under the surface.  Parties knew that their leadership identified with different national 
culture and proceeded with the work at hand almost despite that difference, rather than 
attempting to embrace it as did the parties in alliance 1.  In alliance 3, multiculture was part of 
the very DNA of the relationship and the nature of the work at hand.  It would have been 
arguably impossible to ignore, yet ironically participants from this alliance seemed to have the 
most difficulty discussing this aspect of their relationship.  
Looking across the themes of these three alliances, learning together, hunting together, 
and together to make a difference, the thread is in the alliance itself.  As difficult as it seems to 
succeed, according to research and the characterization of participants in these alliances, these 
parties have found ways to work together to achieve very impressive results.  Those results span 
commercial objectives (like cost savings and supply chain optimization), branding and awareness 
evolution (like promoting the value of the strategic alliance to the marketplace to respond to 
mounting competition),  and ultimately even social and geopolitical objectives (like preservation 
of resources and remediation of marginalization of underprivileged people). That it can be so 
difficult to succeed in alliances seems to be well accepted. That these three alliances have found 
creative, impressive, and even inspiring ways to surmount the daunting realities regarding the 
likelihood of succeeding in complex, multicultural alliances is certainly a rich experience from 




 Table 4.5 summarizes the key themes emerging from leader interviews in the three 
alliances studied. 
Table 4.5 
Themes Emerging From Leader Interviews in the Alliances Studied 
 
     Alliance/         Key theme emerging from   Related themes in other  
      theme #     leader interviews     alliances 
 
    1, theme 1  Ensuring mutual understanding   Alliance 2, theme 4; 
         Alliance 3, theme 2 
 
    1, theme 2  Focus on the customer   Alliance 2, theme 2 
 
    1, theme 2  Trust/evolution of mutual trust  Alliance 2, theme 3 
 
    2, theme 1  Healthy tension 
 
    2, theme 2  Advocacy     Alliance 1, theme 2 
 
    2, theme 3  Trust      Alliance 1, theme 3 
 
    2, theme 4  Common messaging    Alliance 1, theme 1; 
         Alliance 3, theme 2 
    2, theme 5  Linguistic sensitivity 
 
    3, theme 1  Thinking globally/acting locally  Alliance 3, theme 4 
 
    3, theme 2  Clarity of intent    Alliance 1, theme 1; 
         Alliance 2, theme 4 
 
    3, theme 3  Measurable, quantifiable goals 
 






Chapter V: Discussion, Limitations, and Implications for Future Research 
Considering the nature of strategic, asymmetric, multicultural alliances, how these very 
special types of collaboration come about, the experiences of leaders who find themselves 
working in them, and the complexities presented by such relationships, the possibilities for 
learning and the implications for future application are rich.  This chapter presents interpretations 
from the research conducted, both in the body of existing literature and by virtue of the survey 
and multi-case study presented.  Following an interpretation of the findings of this research, a 
discussion of the implications of this research on the study of leadership and change is presented.  
Recommendations are also made for researchers interested in furthering this research.  
Interpretation of Findings 
The survey was intended to explore the relationship of strategic, asymmetric, and 
multicultural makeup of successful alliances.  Intended primarily as a vehicle to help identify 
alliances for future study, the survey also highlighted the relative difficulty of finding such 
alliances.  Despite the fact that the population surveyed was rich in alliance experience, a 
relatively small number of alliances were assessed as successful while also having all of the 
desired high-SAM characteristics.  The observation that multiculture was often the characteristic 
that caused an alliance to fall out of high-SAM status suggests that successful alliances, shown 
by this research to be in the minority even without any other qualification, are still more 
commonly found in less multicultural makeup.  Interview participants supported this observation 
in alliance 1 and alliance 2 by highlighting the difficulties in dealing with multiculture, often 
seeing it not as an advantage, but rather an aspect of the relationship that had to be mitigated 
from a risk perspective.  Ultimately, participants from all three alliances did see multiculture as a 




The survey also highlighted some of the difficulties in identifying and studying such a 
population of alliances.  For example, considerations of language were key.  Language is seen as 
critical in the execution of successful SAM alliances, allowing organizations to work together, as 
in alliance 3, or driving a wedge that could present a significant obstacle to collaboration if not 
sufficiently considered by collaborating parties, as in alliance 2.  Nevertheless, from a standpoint 
of identification of alliances, language did not play as important a role as originally anticipated.  
Such multicultural alliances are forced by their nature to have a lingua franca, which in the case 
of most alliances studied was English.  Additional considerations of language are discussed 
below in the treatment of implications for future research.  
The survey also highlighted another important consideration when examining such 
alliances.  Finding successful, high-SAM alliances which have been in existence for a long 
period of time is very difficult.  This observation is not surprising if one considers the 
implications of technology, travel, access to information, and other practical matters that have 
tended to facilitate global collaboration in the past few decades as compared to prior times.  The 
consideration of globalization highlights the fact that, although factors exist which tend to 
facilitate large scale collaboration across vast geography, many of these evolutions have taken 
place only recently.  
The multi-case study of alliances was intended to look deeper into themes common to 
successful, high-SAM alliances.  Looking across the three cases presented, some of the themes 
from the literature are supported, such as the importance of trust in relationships and the 
observation of unilateral commitments, such as in alliance 1.  Evolution of trust was a common 




on behalf of the other, especially when there was not immediate foreseeable gain for the acting 
party, the relationships improved overall.  
Another theme common in the cases studied was that of inter-alliance tension between 
the collaborating parties.  While in all three cases, there was certainly evidence of parties finding 
ways to work with one another for mutual benefit, and in the case of alliance 3 benefit exogenous 
to the alliance counterparties as well, in all cases the parties had to find ways to identify and 
resolve conflict.  Leadership interventions that were most common across the cases studied for 
responding to conflict included driving a common message, focusing on measurable goals, and 
paying strong attention to advocacy on the part of absent aggrieved parties.  In the case of 
advocacy on the part of absent aggrieved parties, this theme was especially relevant in alliance 2, 
where one party to the alliance had to represent the other party in potential conflict situations 
with the common customer.  In alliance 3, the manifestation of this advocacy was made even 
more real by the observation that the very livelihood of potentially impacted people could rest on 
the ability of leaders to recognize and address the need for advocacy while pursuing the 
objectives of the alliance. 
A final theme, related to leadership intervention but more specifically to the structure of 
leadership within alliances was that of organizational makeup as related to the counterparty 
organizations in the alliance.  In all three cases, fairly complex organizations came together to 
form an alliance which had a leadership structure proprietary to that alliance.  In alliance 2, the 
two parties had vastly different organizational structures, one being a very flat, matrix-type 
organization and the other being a very hierarchical organization.  In alliance 1 and alliance 3, 
the partnering organizations had similar structures, though the significant difference in size and 




organizations.  In all cases, an alliance leadership structure was constructed which forced a sort 
of parity that allowed the alliance to have a power dynamic of its own, allowing for pursuit of the 
alliance goals.  This structuring of the alliance apart from the structure of the partnering 
organizations was in fact a hallmark of the strategic nature of these relationships.  Figure 5.1 
presents the themes observed in terms of exacerbating themes, which tended to make the alliance 
more difficult, mitigating themes, which tended to improve the alliance relationship, disabling 
themes, which tended to be compounded by other dynamics, and the overall enabling theme of 
alliance trust. 
 




Apart from the themes observed, the multi-case study was also intended to uncover the 
influence of  SAM characteristics on the day-to-day experiences of alliance participants and 
collaborating organizations.  Looking at the strategic nature of the relationship, participants in all 
three alliances noted a kind of evolution.  In the case of alliance 1, the relationship began as more 
of a quid pro quo relationship and was transformed through unilateral commitment and 
leadership intervention to uncover learning and promote best practices.  In the case of alliance 2, 
the alliance was strategic from the beginning, but matured in that regard as the partnering 
organizations learned how to work past the lack of exclusivity in their relationship.  By keeping 
dialogue open when other parties were involved and by ensuring that all participants had much to 
gain by working together, the strategic nature of the relationship was enriched throughout the life 
of the alliance, which continues today.  In the case of alliance 3, the partnering organizations had 
a very strong strategic relationship from the beginning.  The degree to which that strong 
relationship influenced the individuals and organizations manifested itself in the way that the 
alliance leadership was able to respond to external forces working at cross purposes with the 
alliance, especially in the political arena.  
The asymmetric nature of the relationship had impact that was quite different in the three 
alliances studied.  In the case of alliance 1 and alliance 3, asymmetry was designed into the 
formation of the alliance, the partners having sought each other out exactly because they had 
different skills and resources to bring to the table.  Individuals were united in their recognition of 
the asymmetry and articulate in the ways in which that asymmetry played itself out in the 
prosecution of the alliance objectives.  In the case of alliance 2, the asymmetry was more subtle, 
and thus the impact on the individuals and organizations was less obvious to those interviewed.  




different, the nature of the work of this alliance was such that any asymmetry played out much 
more with regard to the client itself than with the partnering organizations.  
The three alliances diverged significantly with respect to the manifestation of 
multiculture.  In alliance 1, multiculture was initially a problem for the partnering organizations.  
Parties on both sides of the relationship struggled with understanding the other and came to 
realize the need to learn to work together in this regard.  In the case of alliance 2, multiculture 
was, and always is, a part of the special relationship formed.  At times, the alliance participants 
seemed to embrace this aspect of their relationship and at other times multiculture was 
sublimated in favor of presenting a united front, either to the client or to the marketplace.  In the 
case of alliance 3, perhaps the most multicultural of all of the alliances studied, multiculture was 
so much a part of the coming together of the two organizations that individuals not only had 
difficulty discussing the concept, but also agreed paradoxically that it was critical to the success 
of the alliance.  
A final intent of the multi-case study was to explore the way in which the behaviors, 
interventions, and leadership styles of leaders influenced the successful outcomes of these 
alliances.  In the case of alliance 3 and alliance 1, there were charismatic leaders who believed in 
the mission of the alliance and found ways to make the relationship work.  These leaders were 
humble in their reflection of their own influence.  For example, P3.1 talked selflessly about how 
all parties came together to achieve the goals of alliance 3 while others were almost unanimous 
in citing him as a key driving force behind the success of the alliance due to his personal passion 
and his ability to win over the hearts and minds of others.  In the case of alliance 2, the style of 
leadership was sublimated to a degree by the matrix nature of the relationship, with teams of 




other complex structures.  The question of style was, to significant degree, sublimated by the 
methodological approach to client engagements.  
Considering the efficacy of leadership interventions, alliance 2 and alliance 1 were very 
similar, with alliance 3 presenting as more unique.  In the first two alliances, leaders saw either 
risk to the achievement of goals or additional opportunity for future collaboration and put 
programs and policies in place to capture unmet needs of the collaborating organizations.  In the 
case of alliance 3, the leadership interventions were seen by participants as much more focused 
at the practical issues of funding and mandate, with grassroots efforts playing an additional key 
role in the ultimate success of the alliance, even to the point where the alliance itself has been 
dissolved, but the work continues through programs that were inspired by it or directly created 
through the auspices of program activities. 
Discussion 
The consideration of questions above leads to several conclusions about the experience of 
leaders in successful, high-SAM alliances.  First, is the temporal nature of the attribution of SAM 
to an alliance.  As noted in the evolution of the concept, all alliances have some degree of 
strategic, asymmetric, and multicultural makeup.  In some alliances, the manifestation of these 
attributions is very low, even when perceived across multiple ways of asking the question and 
according to the characterization of multiple alliance participants on different sides of the 
relationship.  In other alliances, one or more of the dimensions is the very hallmark of the 
relationship, as was seen with the alliances studied.  What was very clear in all cases was that 
alliances mature over time.  In some cases, the manifestation of that maturity is a lessening of 




changes can be a result of the overt intentionality of leaders of the alliance or a natural 
progression from external forces and circumstances. 
Several authors have addressed the changing nature of alliances over time.  For example, 
Slywotzky, Baumgartner, Alberts, and Moukanas (2006) wrote of the shift from initial areas of 
focus traditional to alliances, such as outsourcing, to much more complex relationships enabled 
by technology and the resulting improvements in communication and access to information. 
Wrote the authors:  
Globalization will tend to make strong business designs stronger (through global 
sourcing, selling, and science).  It will make weak business designs weaker (through 
more competition, reduced differentiation, and a greater disconnect from customers).  
And it will create more no-profit zones for companies and even entire industries. (p. 24) 
 
Similarly, Austin (2000) wrote of the importance of actively managing the dynamics of a 
relationship over time suggesting “the ultimate effectiveness of an alliance, however, is a 
function of how well the partners manage their interaction.  It is important that a partnership be 
viewed as a relationship rather than a deal” (p. 121).  
There are potential counter arguments to the conclusions drawn here.  One of these 
arguments is that SAM characteristics have only an anecdotal relationship to alliance success 
and, therefore, one must consider other descriptive or exogenous factors to understand these 
complex relationships.  For example, Cullinan and Holland (2002) cited critical elements of 
strategic due diligence including market and industry dynamics, competitor and customer 
analysis, and opportunities for growth.  These alliance criteria are more focused on aspects of an 
alliance that tie to operational efficiencies and mutual synergies.  Hampden-Turner and 
Trompenaars (2000) looked at related themes, such as the continuum from specificity to 
diffuseness, which relates to one of the mitigating themes in Figure 5.1 of common messaging, 




These themes may relate to mitigating or exacerbating themes described herein.  While it is 
certainly true that there are many other factors related to the outcome of an alliance, and 
certainly over the broad spectrum of alliance activity as many reasons to form alliances as to 
presume to understand their degree of success, there seems to be a clear emergence of these 
characteristics as not only directly related to the outcome of the alliances studied, but also to the 
very essence of why these alliances were formed and the important work that they set out to 
accomplish.  
Another observation with regard to successful, high-SAM alliances relates to the way in 
which these types of alliances will necessarily need to evolve over time.  Exogenous factors, 
such as evolving statutory changes intended to force transparency and to address potential 
concerns over domination of global markets and collaboration with governmental denied parties, 
are examples of changes in the global landscape which will require a response in the formation 
and execution of complex strategic alliances.  A related study by Delios, Inkpen, and Ross 
(2004) looked, essentially, at unsuccessful alliances.  The authors wrote of alliances which 
continue to struggle over time, despite failing to meet alliance objectives.  The authors concluded 
that factors such as high termination costs, egregious visibility of the collaboration, and 
significant sunk investment as among the factors that cause such alliances to perpetuate.  One 
potential response to this type of impetus would be a ratcheting-back on the part of partnering 
organizations, tending to be more insular in order to mitigate risk.  Such a response may occur in 
the short term, but the compelling arguments in favor of increased global collaboration, 
especially with regard to organizations that have different size, ability, and access to resources, 
seem to portend an increase in the future incidence of high-SAM relationships in alliance 




Related to the changing landscape with regard to formation of high-SAM alliances is the 
evolving efficiency of markets and economies.  Segil (2004) wrote of the evolution of 
organizations in response to the increasing sophistication of the markets they serve.  Citing two 
organizations which started with a small customer base and grew while the sophistication of the 
market and the customer evolved, the author wrote: 
No matter how large Staples has become, their primary customer remains the individual 
and small business owner.  In that respect, they are a large company that must 
consistently think small.  They are similar to ValleyCrest Companies, which has become 
the biggest in their industry of landscape services and still owned by one family.  They, 
too, maintain their competitive advantage by serving one customer at a time, whether it is 
a landscape architect, a developer, a corporation, city, county, state, the U.S. Olympics 
Committee, a home owners association, or, in select cases an individual. (p. 193) 
 
As seen in alliance 3, leaders in organizations who can respond to such evolving efficiencies will 
be more effective in putting forth programs and solutions than those who try to perpetuate a one-
size-fits-all approach to delivery of products and services.  
Ultimately, organizational structures in alliances need to be flexible in order to respond to 
such change and agile enough to make changes that keep pace with the evolving demand for the 
products and services put forth.  Posth (2006) wrote of his experience leading the first Chinese-
German automobile factory.  This massive undertaking of a strategic, asymmetric, multicultural 
effort that was without precedent serves as an excellent example of the need for flexibility in 
organizational structures, as well as the evolving demands for products and services.  Itschert and 
ul-Haq (2003) presented another such example in an unrelated industry—international banking.  
Implications for Leadership and Change 
The realization that globalization is naturally forcing strategic relationships, asymmetry, 
and multiculture to the forefront, that alliances high in SAM characteristics are more the stuff of 




significant and sobering reflections for practitioners of alliance activities.  Most notably, skills 
and experiences which may have made one successful in the past may be inadequate to drive 
success in the future.  Alliance leadership, especially in large organizations, tends to be grown 
from within, with leaders often selected based on past performance in successful alliance or 
related activities.  If the nature of alliances is changing and the makeup of alliance leadership 
does not keep pace with that change, alliance success will suffer.  It is, therefore, important for 
alliance leadership to be cognizant of this dynamic and to continually invite external learning, 
not only in terms of education and training, but also in terms of involving leadership from 
different cultures and different organizational contexts.  
Alliance activity must also be carefully considered from the perspective of leading 
change in organizations.  As organizations rely more heavily on partnering-type activities to 
achieve growth and mitigate risk, leaders of change must consider aspects such as asymmetry 
and multiculture not simply as interesting reflections on their external relationships, but as 
centers of focus for effective change programs.  As seen in the examples studied, especially in 
alliance 1 and alliance 2, change programs within organizations that consider asymmetry and 
multiculture can be extremely effective in catalyzing meaningful growth, not only in terms of 
organizational success, but also in terms of personal growth of the people involved. 
Finally, with regard to people in a broader sense, it is important to reflect on the 
importance of considering the strategic, asymmetric, and multicultural makeup of alliances with 
regard to humanistic implications.  As seen in the alliances studied here, culture within an 
organization can grow quite richly, as in alliance 1, to the betterment of all parties involved.  
Learning to work together with regard to these aspects of an alliance can also impact potential 




learn from such alliance activity can in fact inform others in a way that not only drives effective 
change, but also produces lasting external benefit. 
Regarding organizations seeking the type of collaboration discussed, there are a number 
of practical recommendations that can be offered.  To emphasize the focus on evolving skills, 
alliance leadership should evaluate the alliance work plans and resource allocations to make sure 
that participants have ample time for learning and growing together.  Placing individuals in roles 
where their skills can be challenged and grow will help not only the individuals, but also the 
alliance itself and future collaboration where leaders will need constantly evolving skills to 
succeed.  Change leadership should similarly be overt with regard to multiculture in particular.  
As seen in this study, multiculture is a particularly challenging element of SAM.  Alliance 
leaders who take a one-size-fits-all approach to change leadership must be challenged to consider 
how the alliance needs to evolve differently in different cultures.  Training should focus on 
communication and team building to foster the evolution of increased mutual trust.  This 
approach requires careful consideration, as any overt effort to apply different practices in one 
part of the world could also lead to unintended marginalization.  Thus, ongoing evaluation of the 
efficacy of change leadership interventions is also strongly recommended.  Ultimately, the 
greatest need is for transparency and continual re-evaluation, not only to ensure the efficacy of 
leadership interventions, but also to account for the changing nature of alliance makeup over 
time. 
Future Research 
There were necessarily limitations to this research which can provide important 
opportunities for others to continue this work.  A compelling example, as noted above, is the 




ultimately it did not play a large role in the study of these alliances.  As alliance activity matures 
and additional examples of successful, high-SAM alliances emerge in truly multilingual settings, 
it could be very valuable to consider how language, metaphor, writing system, and related factors 
influence such alliance activity.  Harkness, Van de Vijver, and Mohler (2003) outlined one 
method of treating language differences in survey methods via the use of translators, reviewers, 
and adjudicators.  Nevertheless, such methods would need to be carefully designed so that the 
language itself is not the key focus of the study. 
Language is not the only factor that was under-represented in this study.  Another area 
which was limited was access to certain types of alliances.  For example, secretive government 
operations, highly secure private sector activities such as applied research, and illegal 
organizations and affiliations could present fascinating extensions to this line of research.  Of 
necessity, potential researchers in looking at these types of alliances would face even more 
daunting challenges in terms of access, informed consent, and ethical considerations.  
Nevertheless, a study which discovers an appropriate treatment for such concerns could be very 
effective and compelling. 
Another consideration in terms of continuing research would be potential augmentation 
to support the findings herein.  For example, a quantitative, factor-based analysis that could 
develop an evaluative scale for better stratification of SAM characteristics, coupled with the 
understanding of the themes and experiential learnings presented in this study, could be very 
effective for furthering the understanding of these alliances.  Another abstraction of quantitative 
approach, possibly enabled by such a scale, would be a study of the evolution of SAM over time 





In the introduction to this study, I noted that it is difficult to find examples of 
organizations that operate on a significant scale without a form of collaboration.  One can see 
collaboration in a myriad of examples apart from business.  For example, in world politics, one 
sees the formation of coalitions and alliances to respond to mounting global threats as well as to 
respond to environmental and social challenges.  In technology, one sees collaboration in the 
form of emerging capabilities, such as sentiment analysis and cloud computing.  In our school 
systems, one sees emerging models for groups to work together on team projects and group 
learning activities.  In business, a natural analog to these dynamics is clearly the mounting 
incidence of alliance activity.  Through careful consideration of types of alliances such as 
strategic, asymmetric, multicultural alliances, leaders can inform their thinking and challenge 
themselves and others to new aspirations.  My aspiration in this regard is that this work will 
inform in some small way that thinking and inspire others to collaborate in new ways in business 












Appendix A: Exemplars Used for Final Survey 
  
For each of the four parts of the survey, I used the following as a basis for the survey 
questions: 
Part I - success of the alliance  
Taylor, A. (2005). An operations perspective on strategic alliance success factors: An 
exploratory study of alliance managers in the software industry. International Journal 
of Operations & Production Management, 25(5), 469-490. 
Part II - strategic makeup of the alliance 
Bleeke, J., & Ernst, D. (1995). Is your strategic alliance really a sale? Harvard Business 
Review, January-February, 97-105. 
Segil, L. (2004). Measuring the value of partnering: How to use metrics to plan, develop, and 
implement successful alliances. New York, NY: Amacom. 
Part III - degree of asymmetry (equality in access to resources and other factors) 
Dussauge, P., Garrette, B., & Mitchell, W. (2004). Asymmetric performance: The market 
share impact of scale and link alliances in the global auto industry. Strategic 
Management Journal, 25(7), 701-711. 
 
Part IV - cultural makeup of the alliance 
Spekman, R., Isabella, L., & MacAvoy, T. (2000). Alliance competence: Maximizing the 





(Please note that due to technology differences, the appearance of the online 
survey differs from the presentation of the survey below. The instructions and 
text, however, are the same.) 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCE SURVEY – Page 1 of 6 
Introduction 
This survey is being conducted as part of doctoral research for a dissertation on the 
topic of multicultural strategic alliances.  
 
I am requesting your participation in this survey based on your involvement in one or 
more business alliances (e.g., joint ventures, partnerships, or other shared equity 
organizational structures).  
 
Throughout the survey, the following terminology is used:  
• “all iance organizations” is used to refer to the organizations involved in 
these relationships.  
• “all iance participants” is used to refer to the people who are working in the 
alliance. 
 
Individual responses will not be identified and will be treated in strictest confidence. 
To protect your privacy, you are not required to supply your name or the name of 
your organization to participate in this survey.  
 
This survey is divided into four parts.  
 
• Part I pertains to the success of the alliance.  
• Part II pertains to the strategic makeup of the alliance. 
• Part III pertains to the degree of symmetry (equality in access to resources 
and other factors). 
• Part IV pertains to the cultural makeup of the alliance. 
 
Please note: If you have been involved in more than one alliance, select the alliance 
with which you are most familiar and limit your responses to thinking about only that 
one alliance when answering this survey. 
 
Thank you very much for your participation. Your time and effort are sincerely 
appreciated. 
 






STRATEGIC ALLIANCE SURVEY – Page 2 of 6 
Basic Identifying Information 
 
Please provide a general understanding of the alliance that you are considering for this survey.  
Description of the alliance (e.g., Joint venture between a French manufacturing company and a 
U.S. automobile company). [                                     ] 
Approximate duration of the alliance (in years and months). [                                    ] 
Is the alliance still in existence [YES/NO] 
How long was/is your personal involvement with the alliance (in years and months)? [             ] 
You may wish access to the final published dissertation. Additionally, as part of future phases of 
this research, it would be helpful to contact some respondents. If you would be willing to be 
contacted for either reason, please provide contact information (email address and/or phone 
number). Any contact information you share will be kept strictly confidential and will not be 




 STRATEGIC ALLIANCE SURVEY– Page 3 of 6 
 
PART I –  Al l iance Success 
Please double-click on only one box per statement to indicate the degree to which it applies to the alliance.  
Note: If you are not completely sure how to answer a question, please select the best possible answer given your 



















1. The alliance organizations have corporate cultures that are 
compatible 
    
2. There is an alliance charter which clearly defines what all alliance 
participants must do     
3. Alliance participants clearly understand what their role requires 
them to do in the alliance     
4. Senior leadership on all sides of the alliance is highly supportive 
of the alliance     
5. Alliance participants feel comfortable engaging in open, honest 
communication     
6. Alliance participants are willing to share knowledge      
7. The alliance organizations have objectives that are mutually 
consistent     
8. The alliance is operated independently from the operation of the 
individual organizations involved in the alliance     
9. Alliance participants take active steps to build and sustain mutual 
trust     
10. Alliance participants share influence in the alliance 





STRATEGIC ALLIANCE SURVEY– Page 4 of 6 
 
PART II  –  Al l iance Strategic Makeup 
Please double-click on only one box per statement to indicate the degree to which it applies to the alliance. 
Note: If you are not completely sure how to answer a question, please select the best possible answer given your 



















1. The alliance organizations share proportionally (in accordance 
with their investment) in the success of the alliance     
2. The alliance organizations have compatible missions     
3. The alliance organizations have compatible values     
4. The alliance organizations serve similar markets     
5. The alliance organizations have compatible core competencies 
to enable the alliance     
6. The alliance organizations have compatible products to enable 
the alliance     
7. The alliance organizations have compatible objectives for the 
alliance     
8. The alliance organizations share a common view of the value 
that is delivered to customers by the alliance       
9. The alliance organizations have compatible strategic intents for 
the alliance     
10. The alliance organizations share a common view of alliance 





STRATEGIC ALLIANCE SURVEY– Page 5 of 6 
 
PART III  –  Al l iance Symmetry 
Please double-click on only one box per statement to indicate the degree to which it applies to the alliance. 
Note: If you are not completely sure how to answer a question, please select the best possible answer given your 



















1. One of the alliance organizations has significantly greater market 
share     
2. One of the alliance organizations has many more years in 
business     
3. One of the alliance organizations holds significantly more equity 
in the alliance than the other     
4. Only one of the alliance organizations previously did business in 
the country where the alliance is primarily operating      
5. One of the alliance organizations has greater financial resources     
6. The alliance is based on a contract rather than equity joint 
venture     
7. One of the alliance organizations has more need to demonstrate 
success quickly     
8. One of the alliance organizations has more employees     
9. One of the alliance organizations has greater revenue     
10. One of the alliance organizations has greater brand recognition 





STRATEGIC ALLIANCE SURVEY– Page 6 of 6 
 
PART IV – Al l iance Cultural Makeup 
Please double-click on only one box per statement to indicate the degree to which it applies to the alliance. 
Note: If you are not completely sure how to answer a question, please select the best possible answer given your 
understanding. Do not leave any questions blank. 
 
The questions in this section use the term “national culture.” This term is intended to refer to the typical business 
culture (i.e., ideas, corporate identities, educational foundation, heritage, language, or other demographic 
aspects) from a particular part of the world  with which the alliance organization primarily identifies itself. If an 
alliance organization is multinational, the term should refer to the country most predominantly influencing the 



















1. The national culture of one alliance organization is more 
sensitive to punctuality     
2. The national culture of one alliance organization is more team-
oriented     
3. The national cultures differ with respect to favoring direct 
communication over working through diplomatic channels     
4. The national cultures differ in their treatment of ambiguity     
5. The national cultures differ with respect to hierarchical 
management styles     
6. The national cultures differ with respect to harmonious labor  
relations     
7. The national cultures differ with respect to adoption of technology     
8. The national cultures differ with respect to focus on marketing vs. 
engineering     
9. The national cultures differ with respect to business / government 
relations     
10. The national cultures differ with respect to the rate of change in 
the business environment     
 
 





Appendix B: Interview Template 
  
I will first thank the research participant for his or her time and express my gratitude for 
their important contribution. I will set expectations that the interview will take no longer than 60 
minutes. I will ask the research participant to confirm that they agree that I will record the 
interview and that I will remove all information that may identify the participant, but may use the 
transcript in whole or in part in my dissertation. 
I will then say, approximately: 
We are speaking today because you have experience in a strategic alliance that has very 
interesting characteristics, being multicultural (I will allude to the countries involved), and also 
involving parties with different access to resources (I will allude to the specific resources that 
lead to asymmetry, be they funding, people, market share, etc.). I am interested in your 
experience in this alliance, what it “felt like” to you.  
1. How has your alliance experience been influenced by the fact that you have a 
strategic relationship with [name of other party] rather than a simple fee for service 
relationship? 
2. Please describe the differences in access to resources, for example funding, people, 
market share, and how they affect your alliance relationship. 
3. Considering the fact that [name of partner] is primarily a [dominant culture of 
partner] organization and [name of research participant’s organization] is 
primarily a [dominant culture of research participant’s organization] organization, 
can you describe how this cultural difference has influenced your alliance, either 




4. If you think about your experiences throughout your involvement in this alliance, 
do you see any themes that are characteristic of your working relationships with your 
partners? 
5. How has the leadership of this alliance addressed the kinds of organizational 
differences we have been discussing today? 
I will listen to the responses to each question, interjecting only to confirm my understanding of 
anything said by the participant. If the participant feels the need to use words or phrases in a 
foreign language (presuming I speak that language), I will not interject, though I will seek to 
conduct the preponderance of the discussion in English.  
I will attempt to pace the conversation so that I have some degree of response to each of the 5 
questions. 
At the conclusion of the interview, I will again thank the participant for their time and attention 
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